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The New Banking Law of the European
Economic Community
On December 15, 1989, the European Economic Community (EEC) adopted
the Second Council Directive on the Coordination of Laws, Regulations and
Administrative Provisions Relating to the Taking-up and Pursuit of the Business
of Credit Institutions and Amending Directive 77/780/EEC (the Second Banking
Directive).' The Second Banking Directive is the centerpiece of the new banking
law in the EEC.
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Freie Universitat, Berlin.
**Rechtsanwalt, Frankfurt Bar; Legal Advisor in the Legal Department of a German bank; Dr. jur.
1980, Universit5t Gottingen.
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1. 89/646/EEC, O.J. (No. L 386) 1 (1989) [hereinafter Second Banking Directive]. The Second
Banking Directive enacts with certain modifications the proposal of Feb. 23, 1988, submitted by the
Commission of the European Communities to the Council of Ministers of the European Communities, COM(87)715 Final, O.J. (No. C 84) 1 (1988), as it was amended by the Commission on
Apr. 28, 1989, COM(89)190 Final, O.J. (No. C 167) 33 (1989), mainly to meet the severe criticism
voiced against the strict "reciprocity requirement" imposed upon the entry of non-EEC financial
institutions. See Second Banking Directive, art. 7, in its originally proposed form, COM(87)715
Final, O.J. (No. C 84) 4 (1988). See generally Gruson & Nikowitz, The Second Banking Directive
of the European Economic Community and Its Importance for Non-EEC Banks, 12 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 205 (1989) [hereinafter Gruson & Nikowitz, Second Banking Directive]; Gruson & Nikowitz,
The Reciprocity Requirement of the Second Banking Directive of the European Economic Community
Revisited, 12 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 452 (1989) [hereinafter Gruson & Nikowitz, Second Banking
Directive Revisited); Gruson, Second European Banking Directive, 5 REV. OF BANKING & FIN.
SERVICES No. 16, at 159 (1989); see also the Proposal for a Second Council Directive, COM(87)715
Final (Feb. 16, 1988) (explanatory memorandum accompanying the proposal for the Second Banking
Directive) [hereinafter Explanatory Memorandum].
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The Second Banking Directive obligates the Member States of the EEC to
implement its provisions into their national legislation by conforming their national laws by January 1, 1993. These implementing statutes will transform the
Second Banking Directive into law directly binding on persons doing or intending to do banking business in the EEC. 2
The Second Banking Directive will cause fundamental changes in the legal
framework of the banking business in the EEC, and will profoundly affect both
the way in which banks will be doing business in the EEC and the way in which
non-EEC banks can enter the European market. The fundamental aim of the
Second Banking Directive is to create a single EEC-wide banking market with no
internal barriers to the movement of banking services and the establishment of
branches within the Community.
The keystone of bank supervision envisioned by the Second Banking Directive
is the principle of home country control, pursuant to which each credit institution
will be generally supervised by the authorities and pursuant to the law of the
Member State where it has been licensed as a credit institution (the Home
Member State), even in regard to activities carried out across the borders of, or
through a branch (but not through a subsidiary) located in, another Member State
(the Host Member State). 3 As a consequence, banks doing business in a Member
State that have been licensed by different Home Member States will be subject
to differing legal rules and therefore will not have the same competitive opportunities. Consequently, the creation of a single EEC-wide banking market requires that the basic standards of supervision of the various Member States are
broadly similar.4 The achievement of such harmonization of basic standards of
supervision is the aim of a variety of EEC directives and recommendations that
supplement the provisions of the Second Banking Directive.
I. The First Banking Directive
The First Banking Directive of December 12, 1977, 5 took only a few steps in
the direction of the creation of an EEC-wide banking market. It provides that
each Member State must require its credit institutions to obtain a license in that
Member State before commencing activities, and it establishes certain minimum
requirements for such license. 6 The First Banking Directive does not require the
Member States to automatically permit credit institutions licensed in other Member States to establish branches on their territory. On the contrary, it permits

2. Second Banking Directive, supra note 1, art. 24(1).
3. See infra notes 33-39 and accompanying text.
4. Second Banking Directive, supra note I, fourth "whereas" clause.
5. First Council Directive of 12 December 1977 on the Coordination of Laws, Regulations and
Administrative Provisions Relating to the Taking Up and Pursuit of the Business of Credit Institutions, 77/780/EEC, O.J. (No. L 322) 30 (1977) [hereinafter First Banking Directive].
6. Id. art. 3(l)-(3); see also Second Banking Directive, supra note I, arts. 4(l), 5, 9(4).
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Member States to require that credit institutions from other Member States obtain
a license for the establishment of a branch in their territory. 7 However, the First
Banking Directive requires that Member States grant such a license on the basis
of "national treatment," i.e., "according to the law and procedure applicable to
8
credit institutions established on their territory."
The First Banking Directive does not provide protection from protectionist or
discriminatory measures by Member States directed against the establishment
and operation of branches of non-EEC credit institutions in Member States. On
the contrary, Member States are obliged not to grant more favorable treatment to
branches of non-EEC credit institutions than that accorded to EEC credit institutions and to notify the Commission of all authorizations of branches of nonEEC credit institutions. 9 Nothing is said in the operative part of the First Banking
Directive about the establishment of subsidiaries of non-EEC credit institutions
in the EEC.
The First Banking Directive remains the principal source of EEC law regarding the establishment of branches in Member States by non-EEC credit institutions. In this respect, the First Banking Directive has not been superseded by the
Second Banking Directive. 10
II. The Second Banking Directive
A.

THE SINGLE BANKING LICENSE

The objective of the Second Banking Directive is to create a truly EEC-wide
internal market for banking services. Credit institutions authorized in the Home
Member State will be entitled in each of the other Member States (1) to establish
branches and (2) to offer their services freely to individuals and businesses, in
each case without the need for any further authorization by the Host Member
State." EEC credit institutions will be entitled to operate in this way under their
Home Member State licenses, which will be in the form of an EEC-wide "single
banking license." 12
Thus, the Second Banking Directive does not create a Community (or, as the
Americans would say, "federal") banking license; but it decrees that each Member
State's banking license shall be valid throughout the EEC. The principle proposed by
the Second Banking Directive is one of "mutual recognition": each Member State
7. First Banking Directive, supra note 5, art. 4(I), (4).
8. Id.art. 4(l).
9. Id. art. 9(1), (2). "EEC credit institutions" as used in this chapter means credit institutions
authorized as such in a Member State. For a definition of "credit institution," see infra notes 66-78
and accompanying text.
10. See Second Banking Directive, supra note 1,nineteenth "whereas" clause (the procedures
established in the First Banking Directive, "in particular with regard to the authorization of branches
of credit institutions authorized in third countries, will continue to apply to such institutions").
11. Id. arts. 6(1), 18(1).
12. Id. art. 18(l), fourth "whereas" clause.
SPRING 1991
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recognizes the banking licenses of the other Member States. 13 This principle differs
radically from the concept of "national treatment" 14 prevailing in the United States
with respect to foreign banks, which merely entitles a foreign bank to the same
treatment as a domestic bank. It also differs from the U.S. policy of restricting the
business of each bank to its home state. 15 The principle of mutual recognition gives
credit institutions in one Member State access to all Member States and creates an
EEC-wide inter-Member State banking market.
The recognition of the Home Member State license required by the Second
Banking Directive is limited to certain specified banking activities or powers: the
Home Member State license is valid in other Member States only with respect to
those specified banking activities that are enumerated in the annex to the Second
Banking Directive (the Annex). 16 The Annex defines the scope of the principle
of mutual recognition. Each Member State will have the duty to ensure that at
least the activities listed in the Annex may be pursued in its territory by any credit
institution authorized and supervised by the authorities of its Home Member
State, either through the establishment of a branch or by way of the provision of
services across the Member State border. 17 However, the principle of mutual
recognition extends only to a branch of a credit institution and not to a subsidiary
credit institution, because a subsidiary cannot operate under the parent's license.
A subsidiary, being a separate entity,8 is required to have its own license before
it can engage in banking activities.'
A credit institution licensed in a Member State may provide services throughout the Community with respect to banking activities that meet the following
cumulative criteria: (1) the Home Member State license must permit the pursuit
of such activity or, in other words, must give the credit institutions the power to
conduct such activity; and (2) the activity must be set forth in the Annex. 19
As a consequence, any credit institution authorized as such in its Home Member State may exercise in the Host Member State activities that meet such criteria
even if the same activities are not permitted to similar credit institutions of the
Host Member State. For instance, if a bank is authorized by its Home Member
13. Id., twelfth "whereas"

clause.

14. See Gruson & Nikowitz, The Second Banking Directive, supra note 1, at 213 n.39.

15. For a brief description of the interstate banking prohibition in the United States in the context
of the reciprocity discussion, see id. at 235-37 and infra notes 98-100. See Gruson & Herndl,
Prinzipien des US-Bankrechts, in I ZEITSCHRIFF FUR DAS GESAMTE BANK- UND BORSENWESEN 8- 11
(1990) [hereinafter Gruson & Herndl, U.S. Bankprinzipien].
16. Second Banking Directive, supra note 1, art. 18(l), Annex.
17. Id. But see id. art.21(5), sixteenth "whereas" clause, and the discussion infra note 39 and
accompanying text.
18. However, a Member State must consult with the authorities of the other Member States
involved before licensing a credit institution that is the subsidiary of a credit institution authorized in
another Member State or is the subsidiary of or controlled by a person that has a credit institution
subsidiary or controls a credit institution authorized in another Member State. Id. art. 7. See also id.
art. 11(2) (consultation in case of the acquisition of a qualifying holding in a credit institution by one
of the aforementioned entities or persons).
19. Id. art. 18(1).
VOL. 25, NO. I
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State license to participate in securities issues, it is permitted to do so anywhere
in the EEC, since participation in securities issues is an activity listed in the
Annex. On the other hand, if the Home Member State license does not authorize
participation in securities issues, a credit institution may not engage in this
activity in a Host Member State even if credit institutions licensed in the Host
Member State are entitled to engage in this activity. If the Home Member State
license permits travel agency services, a credit institution still cannot conduct this
activity in a Host Member State by virtue of the Second Banking Directive,
because travel agency services are not included in the Annex.
It follows from articles 59(1) and 56 of the Treaty of Rome that a Host
Member State may subject credit institutions from other Member States to requirements of licensing and supervision if they wish to perform services in the
Host Member State that go beyond the Annex of the Second Banking Directive
but that are permitted to credit institutions of the Host Member State if the
following conditions are met: (1) credit institutions from the Host Member State
are subject to the same requirements, (2) the imposition of a licensing and
supervision requirement in the Host Member State, in addition to that already
imposed by the Home Member State, must be justified on public policy grounds,
and (3) the likelihood of causing harm to the public must justify the licensing
requirement or any other restriction in question.
The banking powers permitted by the banking license of a Member State may
fall short of the powers enumerated in the Annex. In that case, credit institutions
from other Member States may provide services in that Host Member State that
credit institutions licensed in that particular Host Member State are not permitted
to provide. A probable consequence of the Second Banking Directive is that the
powers permitted to banks in all Member States will soon include all the powers
set forth in the Annex. The Second Banking Directive will bring about a harmonization of law by virtue of self-interest of the Member States.
Mutual recognition permits an EEC credit institution to provide its services
anywhere in the EEC irrespective of where it is licensed. However, the Second
Banking Directive forestalls "forum shopping" by obtaining a banking license
in a less restrictive Member State. It states that the principle of mutual recognition requires that Member States not grant an authorization or withdraw an existing authorization where factors such as the credit institution's
activities program, the geographical distribution of activities actually carried on,
"make it quite clear" that the credit institution has opted for the legal system of
one Member State for the purpose of evading stricter standards in force in
another Member State in which it intends to carry on or, if already authorized,
where it is actually carrying on the greater part of its activities. 20 Such power
to refuse or withdraw an authorization is only given to Home Member States.
20. Id., eighth "whereas" clause. Member States must require that the head office of a credit
institution be situated in the same Member State as the registered office, and a credit institution is
deemed situated in the Member State where it has its registered office. Id.
SPRING 1991
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Host Member States do not have the power to refuse or withdraw an authorization
to operate a branch of a credit institution from another Member State. 2' This
provision will prevent the creation of a "banking Delaware" in the EEC.
The Annex to the Second Banking Directive sets forth the activities "integral
to banking" 22 that currently, in the opinion of the Commission,
constitute the
23
core of the traditional banking services in the EEC:
(1) acceptance of deposits and other repayable funds from the public;
(2) lending, including, inter alia, consumer and mortgage credit, factoring
with or without recourse, and financing of commercial transactions,
including forfeiting;
(3) financial leasing;
(4) money transmission services;
(5) issuing and administering means of payment (e.g., credit cards, travelers' cheques, and bankers' drafts);
(6) guarantees and commitments;
(7) trading for own account or for account of customers in:
(a) money market instruments (cheques, bills, CDs, etc.);
(b) foreign exchange;
(c) financial futures and options;
(d) exchange and interest rate instruments;
(e) transferable securities;
(8) participation in share issues and the provision of services related to such
issues;
(9) advice to undertakings on capital structure, industrial strategy, and related questions, and advice and services relating to mergers and the
purchase of undertakings;
(10) money broking;
(11) portfolio management and advice;
(12) safekeeping and administration of securities;
(13) credit reference services;
(14) safe custody services.
The Annex is based on the liberal "universal banking" model; it does not
distinguish between investment banking and commercial banking, and does
not embrace the philosophy of the Glass-Steagall Act, which in the United
States prohibits commercial banks from underwriting and dealing in corporate debt or equity securities 24 and from being affiliated with companies
21. Id.
22. Heading of the Annex to the Proposal for the Second Banking Directive, COM(87)715 Final,
supra note 1.
23. See Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 1, at 114(a).
24. Glass-Steagall Act § 16, 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1988) (national banks); see also Federal
Reserve Act § 9(20), 12 U.S.C. § 335 (1988) (state banks); Glass-Steagall Act § 21, 12 U.S.C. § 378
(1988) (nonmember banks).
VOL. 25, NO. I
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engaged in such business. 25 Thus, the Annex permits a wide range of
securities powers.
The Commission recommends that the Annex be updated under the flexible
26
procedure so that it can respond to the development of new banking services.
The Commission obviously wishes to avoid repeating the experience of U.S.
banking law, which does not easily respond to changing market environments.
B.

ESTABLISHING BRANCHES IN A HOST MEMBER STATE

Under the Second Banking Directive, a Member State may not require a credit
institution already authorized in another Member State to obtain a license
before
27
permitting the credit institution to establish a branch in its territory.
A credit institution wishing to establish a branch in another Member State need only
inform the authorities of its Home Member State of its intention to set up a branch
in the Host Member State. 28 This notification must be accompanied by certain information concerning the credit institution and the branch, in particular the program
of operations and the structural organization of the branch. 29 The Home Member
State authorities must communicate this information and information on the amount
of own funds and the solvency ratio of the credit institution to the authorities of the
prospective Host Member State within three months. 30 The only measure that can
be taken against the establishment of the branch is a refusal by the Home Member
State authorities to inform the Host Member State. This measure may be taken if the
Home Member State authorities have reason to doubt the adequacy of the credit
institution's organizational structure or its financial situation. The Home Member
State must give reasons for such refusal,
which is subject to a right of appeal to the
31
courts of the Home Member State.
The Second Banking Directive abolishes the initial endowment capital that is
currently required by the majority of Member States for the authorization of
branches of credit institutions already authorized in other Member States. 32
C.

HOME COUNTRY AND HOST COUNTRY SUPERVISION

The Second Banking Directive is based on the principle of home country
control, under which each credit institution will generally be supervised by the
25. Glass-Steagall Act § 20, 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1988).
26. See Explanatory Memorandum, supra note I, at 114(a); Second Banking Directive, supra
note 1, art. 22(1).
27. Second Banking Directive, supra note 1, art. 6(1).
28. Id. art. 19(!). A credit institution wishing to provide services in the territory of another
Member State for the first time must also notify the authorities of the Home Member State. Id.
art. 20.
29. Id. art. 19(2).
30. Id. art. 19(3).
31. Id.
32. Id. art. 6(1); Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 1, at 112(c).
SPRING 1991
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authorities of its Home Member State, even in regard to activities carried out
33
across the borders of, or through a branch located in, another Member State.
There are only a few exceptions to that rule.
As a result of insufficient harmonization of liquidity standards and insufficient
coordination in the implementation of monetary policy in the EEC within the
framework of the European Monetary System, the Second Banking Directive
proposes that, as an exception to the principle of home country control, the Host
Member State, pending further coordination, will retain primary responsibility
for the supervision of liquidity of the branches of credit institutions and exclusive
responsibility for the implementation of monetary policy. These measures, however, must not embody discriminatory or restrictive treatment based on the fact
that the credit institution is authorized in another Member State.34
The Second Banking Directive also provides that until there is further coordination of measures designed to supervise risks arising out of open positions on
financial markets outside the Home Member State, the authorities of the Member
State where the financial market is located shall cooperate with the authorities of
the Home Member State to require credit institutions to cover the market risks
incurred by such institutions. 35 In the opinion of the Commission, this arrangement is necessary in light of the events of October 1987, and particularly because
the Directive on a Solvency Ratio 36 (the Solvency Ratio Directive) covers only
credit risk (i.e., risk attaching to the particular type of counterparty in receipt of,
for example, a bank loan or guarantee).3 7 Securities transactions (and most
underwriting and dealing), however, involve market or position risk (i.e., the
risk of a general fall in the market to which anyone who has taken an open
position is exposed). The harmonization of measures against market risks is
currently proposed in the Directive to Determine the Minimum Capital Requirements of Investment Firms (the Capital Adequacy Directive), 38 which shall, in
part, apply to the investment services activities of credit institutions.
Although the activities of a credit institution's branches in a Host Member
State will generally be supervised by the authorities of the Home Member State
according to the rules of the Host Member State, those branches still have to
comply with the legal provisions in force in the Host Member State which have
33. Second Banking Directive, supra note I, fourth & tenth "whereas" clauses, arts. 13, 15.
34. Id. art. 14(2), (3), tenth "whereas" clause.
35. Id. arts. 14(3), 21(l), tenth "whereas" clause. Article 21(1) permits Host Member States to
impose reporting requirements on branches of credit institutions from other Member States located
on their territory for the purpose of discharging their exceptional Host Member State supervisory
responsibilities.
36. Council Directive of 18 December 1989 on a Solvency Ratio for Credit Institutions,
89/647/EEC, O.J. (No. L 386) 14 (1989) [hereinafter Solvency Ratio Directive]; the Solvency Ratio
Directive must be read together with the Council Directive of 17 Apr. 1989 on the Own Funds of
Credit Institutions, 89/299/EEC, O.J. (No. L 124) 16 (1989) [hereinafter Own Funds Directive].
37. Solvency Ratio Directive, supra note 36, third "whereas" clause; Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 1,at 113(c).
38. COM(90)141 Final, O.J. (No. C 152) 6 (1990) [hereinafter the Capital Adequacy Directive];
see infra notes 222-36 and accompanying text.
VOL. 25, NO. I
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been "adopted in the interest of the general good. ' 3 9 It remains to be seen
whether Member States will use this provision to make inroads against the rule
of Home Member State supervision.
D.

HARMONIZATION OF ESSENTIAL SUPERVISORY STANDARDS

Even though the Second Banking Directive does not set out to standardize the
banking laws of the Member States, the Commission is of the view that the
concept of Home Member State supervision requires a harmonization of essential
supervisory standards . 4a The Second Banking Directive harmonizes the following standards:
" minimum capital for authorization and continuing business,
* supervisory control of banks' participations4 1in the nonbank sector, and
* supervisory control of major shareholders.
1. Minimum CapitalizationStandards
A credit institution must have an initial capital of at least five million ECU
before it can obtain a banking license in a Member State.42 Each Member State
may require higher levels of capital of its own credit institutions.4 3 Once the
banking license has been issued, the credit institution will be allowed to open
branches in other Member States without being required to provide endowment
capital for each branch. 44
In addition, the Second Banking Directive requires that a credit institution's
own funds at no time fall below the amount of capital upon which its initial
authorization was based. 45
2. Participationsin the Nonbank Sector
In order to control potential risks to the financial stability of credit institutions
arising out of investments in nonbanking corporations, the Second Banking
39. Second Banking Directive, supra note 1,art. 21(5); see id. art. 19(4), (5). The measures that
a Host Member State may take to enforce its supervisory responsibilities are set forth in art. 21 of
the Second Banking Directive.
40. Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 1,at 1 6.
41. It should be noted that the Second Banking Directive intends to provide common standards
of supervision that must be mutually recognized by the Host Member States' authorities. The Second
Banking Directive is not concerned with imposing regulatory standards on Home Member States as
to how they should treat their own credit institutions (i.e., those licensed by their competent authorities), except that a Member State must not treat its own credit institutions more favorably than credit
institutions from other Member States. Accordingly, the Second Banking Directive permits Home
Member States to establish rules for their own credit institutions that are stricter than those laid down
in arts. 4 (initial minimum capital), 5 (supervisory control of major shareholders), II (acquisition of
qualifying holdings in a credit institution), 12 (supervisory control of participation in the nonbanking
sector), and 16 (professional secrecy during the supervisory procedure) of the Second Banking
Directive. See Second Banking Directive, supra note 1,ninth "whereas" clause.
42. Id.art.
4(1).
43. Id.,
ninth "whereas" clause; see Explanatory Memorandum, supra note I,atII2(a).
44. Second Banking Directive, supra note 1,art.
6(l).
45. Id.art 10(l); see id.art. 1(4).
SPRING 1991
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Directive contains provisions on investments in noncredit and nonfinancial institutions. These investments require particular attention, because they may affect the financial stability of the investing credit institution. 46 Participations in a
subsidiary may affect the soundness of the credit institution if the former runs
into financial difficulties (contagion risk) and equity participations constitute a
long-term freezing of the assets of the investing credit institution. 47
The Second Banking Directive harmonizes differing standards of the Member
States regarding equity participations by credit institutions by limiting credit
institutions in the following two respects, if they wish to acquire or maintain
participations in noncredit or nonfinancial institutions:
(1) a credit institution may not hold a qualifying (10 percent or more) holding 48 of an amount greater than 15 percent of its own funds 49 in an undertaking
that is neither a credit institution 50 nor a financial institution; 5 ' and
(2) the total value of such qualifying holdings may not exceed 60 percent of
own funds of the credit institution. 52 These limits do not apply to shares held
only (i) temporarily during a financial rescue or restructuring operation, (ii)
during the normal course of the underwriting process, or (iii) in the institution's
own name on behalf of others. 53
46. See Gruson, Investment in Foreign Equity Securities and Debt-Equity Conversion by U.S.
Banks, Bank Holding Companies, and Foreign Bank Holding Companies, 1988 COLUM. Bus. L.
REV. 441 [hereinafter Gruson, Investment in Foreign Equity Securities.
47. See Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 1, at II 3(b). Compare the Directive of 13 June
1983 on the Supervision of Credit Institutions on a Consolidated Basis, 83/350/EEC, O.J. (No. L
193) 18 (1983) [hereinafter Directive on Consolidated Supervision]. This Directive has already been
implemented by the Member States. See infra notes 117-41 and accompanying text.
48. "Qualifying holding" is defined in the Second Banking Directive, supra note 1, art. 1(10),
as a direct or indirect holding in an undertaking representing 10 percent or more of the capital or of
the voting rights or making it possible to exercise a significant influence over the management of the
undertaking in which a holding subsists. See infra note 58.
49. The "own funds" of a credit institution mainly consists of the credit institution's capital,
certain reserves, and certain subordinated loan capital, minus certain asset items. Own Funds
Directive, supra note 36, arts. 2-6; Second Banking Directive, supra note I, art. 1(4); see infra
notes 163-83 and accompanying text.
50. For a definition of "credit institution," see infra notes 66-75 and accompanying text.
51. For a definition of "financial institutions," see infra note 70.
52. Second Banking Directive, supra note 1, art. 12(1), (2). Cf. the different approach of the
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (BHCA) § 4(c)(6), 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(6) (1988), pursuant to
which U.S. bank holding companies may not control more than 5 percent of any class of voting stock
of a company engaged in nonbanking activities. The limits of art. 12(1), (2) of the Second Banking
Directive do not apply to qualifying holdings in credit institutions, financial institutions, or companies the activities of which are a direct extension of banking or concern services ancillary to banking,
such as leasing, factoring, the management of unit trusts, the management of data processing
services, or any other similar activity. Second Banking Directive, supra note 1, art. 12(1); Bank
Accounting Directive, infra note 146, art. 43(2)(f). Similarly, U.S. bank holding companies may
own 100 percent of subsidiaries engaged in activities closely related to banking. BHCA § 4(c)(8), 12
U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1988).
53. Cf. BHCA § 4(c)(2), 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(2) (1988) (debt previously contracted), and
Regulation Y, 12 C.F.R. 225.124(d) (1990) (underwriting exception). Furthermore, the limits do not
apply to shares that do not constitute fixed assets in accordance with art. 35(2) of the Bank AcVOL. 25, NO. I
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The limits mentioned above may be exceeded in exceptional circumstances.
However, in that case the supervisory authorities of the Home Member State of
the credit institution exceeding its limits must require such credit institution to
increase its own funds or to take other equivalent measures. 54 Compliance with
these limits shall be ensured by the authorities of the Home Member State by
means of supervision on a consolidated basis in accordance with the Directive on
Consolidated Supervision. 55 The authorities of the Home Member State need not
apply these limits if they require that 100 percent of the amounts by which a
credit institution's qualifying holdings exceed those limits must be covered by
own funds and56that the latter shall not be included in the calculation of the
solvency ratio.
3. Control of the Major Shareholders
As in the United States, the ownership and control of a credit institution by
nonbanking interests is an issue of concern for the Second Banking Directive
because of the risks of cross-financing and conflicts of interest. For this reason,
the Second Banking Directive requires that the supervisory authorities of the
Home Member State, before granting an authorization to a credit institution,
must be informed of the identity of shareholders and members who have a
qualifying holding
in the proposed credit institution, as well as of the amount of
57
such holdings.

A qualifying holding is defined as "a direct or indirect holding in an undertaking which represents 10% or more of the capital or of the voting rights or

counting Directive, infra note 146. Second Banking Directive, supra note I, art. 12(4). It is important to note that the Member States need not apply the limits laid down in art. 12(1), (2) to a credit
institution's holdings in insurance companies as defined in the Bank Accounting Directive and
Directive 79/267/EEC, O.J. (No. L 63) 1 (1979). Second Banking Directive, supra note 1,art. 12(3).
This is in sharp contrast to the situation in the United States, where BHCA § 4(c)(8), 12 U.S.C.
§ 1843(c)(8) (1988), prohibits bank holding companies from providing insurance as a principal,
agent, or broker or from acquiring shares of any company involved in any of those activities. 12
C.F.R. 211.23(f)(5)(iii)(B) (1990) (Regulation K) makes it in fact impossible for foreign companies
to engage in the United States at the same time in banking and insurance business. To a limited extent
U.S. banks or bank holding companies are permitted to underwrite credit life insurance and credit
health insurance outside the United States. 12 C.F.R. 211.5(d)(5) (1990) (Regulation K). In addition, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve Board) has approved
by order on a case-by-case basis a number of applications for U.S. banking organizations to engage
outside the United States in the underwriting of life and similar insurance risks through separate
subsidiaries, but has not permitted underwriting property or casualty insurance; see 55 Fed. Reg.
32,426 (1990) (proposed amendment of Regulation K).
54. Second Banking Directive, supra note 1,art. 12(5).
55. Id. art. 12(6); Directive on Consolidated Supervision, supra note 47, art. 3(3), (4).
56. Second Banking Directive, supra note 1,art. 12(8). If both limits are exceeded, the amount
to be covered by own funds shall be the greater of the excess amounts. Id. Credit institutions which,
on the date of entry into force of the Member State laws implementing the Second Banking Directive,
exceed the limits of arts. 12(1), (2) have a period of ten years to comply with such limits. Id. art.
12(7).
57. Id. art. 5; see Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 1, at I12(b).
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which makes it possible to exercise a significant influence over the management
of the undertaking in which a holding subsists." 58 The competent authorities are
directed not to grant an authorization if, taking into account the need to ensure
sound and prudent management of the credit institution, they are not satisfied as
to the suitability of such shareholders or members. 5 9
The Second Banking Directive also requires each prospective purchaser to
give prior notification to the competent authorities of the Member State of a
proposed direct or indirect acquisition of a qualifying holding in a credit institution that is already in operation, and of a proposed increase of a qualifying
holding that would result in a person's holding reaching or passing the threshold
of 20 percent, 33 percent, or 50 percent of voting rights or capital or would result
in the credit institution becoming such person's subsidiary. 60 This provision
enables the supervisory authorities to assess-and, as they see fit, to reject-any
major shareholder of a credit institution or any inappropriate group structure that
could be unsuitable to safe and sound banking management. 6' Likewise, any
shareholder or member owning a qualifying holding in a credit institution who
proposes to dispose of that holding, to reduce it below 20 percent, 33 percent, or
50 percent measured by voting right or capital, or to reduce the holding below the
subsidiary level must inform the competent authorities. 62 In addition, the credit
institution itself must, on becoming aware of them, inform the competent authorities of any acquisition or disposal of holdings in its capital that causes the
holdings to exceed or fall below the 20 percent, 33 percent, or 50 percent levels
and must at least once a year furnish to the competent authorities the names of
shareholders and members owning qualifying holdings and the size of their
holdings.6 3

58. Second Banking Directive, supra note I, art. 1(10). See the Proposal of the Second Banking
Directive, COM(87)715 Final, supra note I, art. I, indent 9, which referred to the definition of a
"significant influence" in article 33 of the Seventh Council Directive of 13 June 1983 based on
Article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty on Consolidated Accounts, 83/349/EEC, O.J. (No. L 193) 1 (1983)
[hereinafter Seventh Council Directive]. Pursuant to that definition, "significant influence" exists
when an undertaking "has 20 percent or more of the shareholders' or members' voting rights in
[another] undertaking." The definition of a "qualifying holding" in the Second Banking Directive
no longer refers to the definition of "significant influence" in the Seventh Council Directive.
59. Second Banking Directive, supra note I, art. 5.
60. Id. art. I1(l). "Subsidiary" is defined in the Second Banking Directive, art. 1(13), by
reference to arts. I & 2 of the Seventh Council Directive, supra note 58, essentially as an undertaking (i) in which a parent undertaking has a majority of the shareholders' or members' voting

rights, or has the right to appoint or remove a majority of the administrative, management, or
supervisory body, and is at the same time a shareholder, or (ii) that can be controlled ("dominant
influence") by the parent undertaking by means of other arrangements or rights. Cf. BHCA § 2(d),
12 U.S.C. § 1841(d) (1988); and 12 C.F.R. 211.2(p) (1990) (Regulation K); see Gruson, Investment
in Foreign Equity Securities, supra note 46, at 444-47.
61. Second Banking Directive, supra note I, art. 1 (1); see Explanatory Memorandum, supra
note I, at 11 3(a); cf BHCA § 3(a)(3), 12 U.S.C. § 1842(a)(3) (1988); Federal Deposit Insurance Act
§ 7(j), 12 U.S.C. § 1817(j) (1988) (Change in Bank Control Act).
62. Second Banking Directive, supra note I, art. 11(3).
63. Id. art. 11(4).
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Whenever shareholders or members holding qualifying holdings in a credit
institution exercise their influence in a way that is likely to be detrimental to
prudent and sound management of the credit institution, the competent authorities of the Member State may take "appropriate measures to put an end to that
situation."64 Such measures may consist, in particular, of injunctions, sanctions
against directors and managers, or the suspension of the voting rights of the
shares held by the shareholders or members in question.65 The Second Banking
Directive does not specify under what conditions a Member State may take these
serious measures.
E.

CREDIT INSTITUTIONS AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

The Second Banking Directive applies to "credit institutions." A credit institution is defined as an "undertaking whose business is to receive deposits or
66
other repayable funds from the public and to grant credits for its own account."
According to the Second Banking Directive, credit institutions that are authorized and supervised as credit institutions by the competent authorities of their
Home Member States will benefit from mutual-i.e., EEC-wide-recognition of
their banking licenses with respect to the activities enumerated in the Annex and
for which they are licensed in the Home Member State. 67 This means that the
following entities or activities do not benefit from mutual recognition:
(1) entities that are not authorized and supervised as credit institutions, i.e., a
deposit-taking institution, by a Member State, even though they are engaged in
some of the activities set forth in the Annex (for example, if a company engages
only in financial leasing, and as such is not authorized and supervised by the
Home Member State as a credit institution, it is not a credit institution under the
Second Banking Directive, although financial leasing is an activity listed in the
Annex); 68 and
(2) entities that engage in activities not included in the Annex even though
they are authorized and supervised as credit institutions by a Member State.
Subsidiaries established in EEC countries by non-EEC persons under a license
for credit institutions are credit institutions benefiting from the principle of mutual recognition. In other words, non-EEC ownership or control of a credit
institution does not destroy the mutual recognition of the license of the credit

64. Id. art. 11(5).
65. Id.
66. First Banking Directive, supra note 5, art. 1; Second Banking Directive, supra note 1,
arts. 1(l), 2(2). The BHCA § 2(c) defines "bank" in a similar fashion, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (1988).
The key characteristic of a credit institution is deposit taking. The Second Banking Directive, supra
note 1, art. 3 provides that Member States shall prohibit persons or undertakings that are not credit
institutions from carrying on the business of taking deposits or other repayable funds from the public.
67. Second Banking Directive, supra note 1, arts. 6(l), 18(l).
68. This is true even if the activity can be undertaken in the Home Member State without prior
authorization. Articles 6(1) & 18(1) of the Second Banking Directive apply only to "credit institutions." See id. art. 2.
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institution. Community branches of non-EEC credit institutions are not authorized as credit institutions by a Member State and therefore do not benefit from
mutual recognition.
In some Member States, credit institutions are not authorized to engage directly
in some of the activities listed in the Annex (for example, leasing, factoring,
dealing in securities, mortgage lending), but must conduct such activities through
subsidiaries that are not credit institutions. 69 Article 18(2) of the Second Banking
Directive, however, permits such financial institutions 70 that are subsidiaries of
a credit institution (or of credit institutions) also to branch freely and to provide
7
services in the Member States, provided the following conditions are met: '
consolidated
(1) the activities of the financial institution subsidiary are fully
72
institutions;
or
institution
credit
parent
the
of
those
with
(2) the parent undertaking or undertakings must be authorized as credit
institutions in the Member State whose law governs the financial instior more of the voting rights
tution subsidiary and must hold 90 percent
73
attaching to shares of the subsidiary;
(3) each parent credit institution must satisfy the competent authorities regarding the prudent management of the financial institution subsidiary
and must accept full responsibility for the subsidiary, i.e., it must guarantee the commitments entered into by the subsidiary; 74 and
(4) the financial institution subsidiary must actually carry out the activities
listed in the Annex within the territory of the Member State in which the
parent credit institution is authorized.7 5

69. See Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 1, at II 4(b).
70. "Financial institution" is an undertaking, not being a credit institution, whose principal
activity is to acquire holdings or to carry on one or more of the activities listed in points 2-12 in the
Annex, Second Banking Directive, art. 1(6). Cf. the definition of "financial institution" in the
Directive on Consolidated Supervision, supra note 47, art. 1. Subsidiaries of an EEC credit institution meeting the conditions of art. 18(2) of the Second Banking Directive are called "financial
institutions fulfilling the conditions laid down in Article 18(2)." Second Banking Directive, supra
note 1, art. 18(2).
71. Second Banking Directive, supra note 1, art. 18(2), fourteenth "whereas" clause.
72. Id. art. 18(2). Article 18(2) requires that the subsidiary is effectively included, in particular
for the activities in question, in the consolidated supervision of its parent credit institution, in
accordance with the Directive on Consolidated Supervision, supra note 47, notably for the calculation of the solvency ratio, for the control of large exposures, and for the purpose of limiting holdings
in accordance with the Second Banking Directive, supra note 1, art. 12.
73. Second Banking Directive, supra note 1, art. 18(2). Article 18(2) permits the joint ownership of a subsidiary by several EEC credit institutions.
74. Second Banking Directive, supra note I, art. 18(2). Compare the totally different approach
taken by the Federal Reserve Board with respect to securities subsidiaries of U.S. bank holding
companies. See Welsh, Extending Securities Firewalls Overseas, 5 REV. OF BANKING & FIN. SERVICES No. 6, at 53 (1989). Also compare art. 18(2) with §§ 23A & 23B of the Federal Reserve Act,
12 U.S.C. § 371(c) (1988), and with § 18(j) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1828(j) (1988), which severely restrict all transactions (including guarantees) of member banks and
banks whose deposits are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation with their affiliates.
75. Second Banking Directive, supra note 1, art. 18(2).
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The principle of Home Member State control and supervision applies to such
subsidiaries. The extension of the rule of mutual recognition to financial institution subsidiaries applies only to such subsidiaries of a credit institution authorized in a Member State. It does not apply to U.S.-based or EEC-based nonbanking subsidiaries of a U.S. bank or a U.S. bank holding company. Such
EEC-based subsidiaries of non-EEC entities must be authorized as credit institutions in a Member State in order to benefit from the Second Banking Directive.
While the aforementioned article 18(2) of the Second Banking Directive extends the scope of mutual recognition to noncredit institution subsidiaries of
credit institutions that meet the conditions of article 18(2), the Directive on
Consolidated Supervision generally provides for home country supervision of the
consolidated financial condition of a credit institution and all its credit and
financial institution subsidiaries. 76 The Directive on Consolidated Supervision
does not extend the benefit of mutual recognition of banking licenses to noncredit
institutions. Mutual recognition is available only to those financial institutions
that meet the conditions of article 18(2) of the Second Banking Directive, 7 7 e.g.,
that are 90 percent owned by the credit institution and established and operating
78
in the same country as the parent credit institution.
F.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SECOND BANKING
DIRECTIVE AND THE INVESTMENT SERVICES DIRECTIVE

After its adoption, the currently proposed Council Directive on Investment
Services in the Securities Field (the Investment Services Directive) 79 will provide
for mutual recognition of licenses of investment firms, home country control,
and harmonization of essential supervisory standards for investment firms 80 in a
similar fashion as the Second Banking Directive does for credit institutions. The
activities to which the Investment Services Directive applies are listed in the
annex of the Investment Services Directive. The list includes trading, dealing in,
and underwriting securities, and providing investment advice. Some of these

76. Directive on Consolidated Supervision, supra note 47, art. 3.
77. Second Banking Directive, supra note I, art. 18(2).
78. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
79. Amended Proposal for a Council Directive on Investment Services in the Securities Field,
90/C42/06, O.J. (No. C 42) 7 (1990) [hereinafter Investment Services Directive]. The Investment
Services Directive will allow an investment firm, once authorized in its home Member State, either
to establish branches in another Member State without authorization of the Host Member State or to
provide freely services in another Member State without an establishment. Id. art. 12. It also
liberalizes the membership in stock and derivative exchanges in the EEC, a feature not contained in
the Second Banking Directive. Id. art. 13.
80. "Investment firms" are entities whose business it is to provide any investment service, i.e.,
the following activities listed in the annex to the Investment Services Directive: brokerage, dealing
as principal, market making, portfolio management, arranging or offering underwriting services in
respect of certain instruments, professional investment advice, and safekeeping and administration of
certain investments. Investment Services Directive, supra note 79, art. 1(2), (3), annex.
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activities overlap with those activities for which mutual recognition is already
accorded by the Second Banking Directive. In other words, credit institutions are
not required to be authorized as an investment firm to provide investment services but may provide a wide variety of such investment services already by
virtue of their single banking license.
Since a credit institution's investment services are part of the institution's
overall activities, those investment services are subject to the supervisory standards set forth in the Second Banking Directive and the secondary directives
adopted for credit institutions to supplement the Second Banking Directive. In
addition, credit institutions are subject to those harmonized prudential measures 8 ' in the Investment Services Directive specifically dealing with risks inherent in the provision of investment services (e.g., provisions against market
risks, 82 provisions requiring separation of client property from firm property and
dealing with conflicts of interest, 83 and provisions granting access to stock exchanges and clearing systems 84).
The proposed Capital Adequacy Directive provides for minimum capital requirements for investment firms. 85 These provisions are intended to apply also to
credit institutions providing investment services, thereby adding a second layer
of minimum capital requirements besides the solvency ratio requirements 86 to
which banks are primarily subject.
The European banking industry has argued that a dual capital adequacy requirement would place an excessive burden on the banks' capital structure.
During a discussion with Member States, the Commission has now conceded that
the objectives of the Investment Services Directive could most effectively be
achieved by giving the Member States' banking supervisors the choice of applying the existing 8 percent solvency ratio to all activities of banks, including
their investment services operations, or allowing banks to separate out the investment services book, making it subject to the Capital Adequacy Directive. 87

G.

IMPACT ON

NON-EEC

CREDIT INSTITUTIONS

Subsidiaries of non-EEC entities established in any Member State that are
credit institutions authorized by such Member State benefit in the same way as
other EEC credit institutions from mutual recognition of their licenses, i.e.,
they have the right to establish branches and to provide service throughout the

81. Id. art. 2.
82. Id. art. 9(2).
83. Id. art. 11.
84. Id. art. 13.
85. See supra note 38, and infra notes 222-36 and accompanying text.
86. See infra notes 227-30 and accompanying text.
87. See infra notes 221-35 and accompanying text. For a discussion of credit institutions'
solvency ratio requirements, see infra notes 143-62 and accompanying text.
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EEC. 88 Thus, a non-EEC entity (i.e., an entity that does not have an EEC
banking license, such as a non-EEC bank or a non-EEC financial institution)
can only benefit from the principles of the Second Banking Directive if it has a
credit institution subsidiary authorized in a Member State. Branches of non89
EEC banks in the EEC do not share in the benefit of those rights.
For the establishment of a credit institution subsidiary or the acquisition of a
holding in an EEC credit institution by a non-EEC bank, the Second Banking
Directive establishes a requirement of reciprocity. 90 The barrier that the EEC
might establish against the entry of non-EEC banks based on the reciprocity
requirement
has been widely discussed, especially in the United States and
91
Japan.
The Second Banking Directive requires Member States to inform the Commission of any authorization of a credit institution that is a subsidiary of a
non-EEC parent company, or any acquisition of a holding in a credit institution
by a non-EEC company resulting in the credit institution becoming an EEC
subsidiary of the non-EEC parent. 92 Whenever it appears to the Commission that
a non-EEC country discriminates against EEC credit institutions or does not
grant reciprocity, the Commission may require the Member States to inform the
Commission of each request by a company from such country for an authorization to establish an EEC credit institution subsidiary and of each notification by
a company from such country of a proposal to acquire a holding in an EEC credit
93
institution that would make the credit institution a subsidiary of such company.
In addition to the information given to the Commission regarding specific applications, article 9(1) requires each Member State to inform the Commission
"of any general difficulties encountered by their credit institutions in establishing
themselves or carrying on banking activities in a third country."
Article 9(2) requires that the Commission shall, initially not later than six
months before the Second Banking Directive enters into force and then periodically, draw up a report examining the treatment accorded to EEC credit institutions in third countries. These reports are to be in regard to the establishment
and carrying on of banking activities, and the acquisition of holdings in credit

88. Second Banking Directive, supra note 1, arts. 6(l), 18(1). Explanatory Memorandum,
supra note I, at 112(e).
89. Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 1, at II 2(e); Second Banking Directive, supra note 1,
nineteenth "whereas" clause.
90. Second Banking Directive, supra note 1, art. 9.
91. See the discussion of reciprocity in Gruson & Nikowitz, The Second Banking Directive,
supra note 1, at 229-40.
92. Second Banking Directive, supra note 1, art. 8. When authorization is granted to the direct
or indirect subsidiary of one or more parent undertakings governed by the law of third countries, the
structure of the group shall be specified in the notification that the competent authorities shall address
to the Commission in accordance with the First Banking Directive, supra note 1, art. 3(7), Second
Banking Directive, supra note 1, art. 8, last para.
93. Id. art. 9(5).
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institutions. The Commission is required to submit this report to the Council of
Ministers of the EEC. 94
If, on the basis of such reports or on the basis of other information, the
Commission believes that a non-EEC country discriminates against EEC credit
institutions or does not grant reciprocity to EEC credit institutions, the Commission may take the following courses of action:
(1) Under article 9(3), if a third country does not accord reciprocaltreatment
to EEC credit institutions (i.e., it does not grant the EEC credit institutions
"effective market access comparable to that granted by the Community to credit
institutions from that third country"), the Commission may request from the
Council a mandate for negotiations "with a view to obtaining comparable competitive opportunities for Community credit institutions."
(2) Under article 9(4), if a third country discriminates against EEC credit
institutions (i.e., EEC credit institutions "do not receive national treatment
offering the same competitive opportunities as are available to domestic credit
institutions and the conditions of effective market access are not fulfilled"), the
Commission may initiate negotiations with the third country to remedy the situation; however, it may also decide that, in addition, the Member States must
generally limit or suspend their decisions regarding pending or future requests by
direct or indirect parent undertakings from the discriminating country for authorization of credit institution subsidiaries and for the approval of the acquisition
of holdings in credit institutions. 95 Article 9 considers discrimination to be an
event that calls for the most serious response by the EEC. In effect, article 9(4)
creates a rule of reciprocal national treatment insofar as entry into the EEC is
concerned: national treatment with respect to entry is only available to credit
institutions from third countries that in turn grant national treatment to9 6EEC
credit institutions with respect to their operations in such third countries.
While article 9(4) gives the Commission the authority to blacklist a particular
country as discriminatory against EEC credit institutions and thereby authorizes
the Commission to limit or suspend the Member States' decision to permit a
company from the blacklisted country to establish a credit institution subsidiary
in the EEC or to acquire a holding in an EEC credit institution, the Commission
has no authority to suspend the decision of a Member State to permit the de novo
establishment or acquisition in a particular case. In other words, Member States
retain their sovereign power to grant banking licenses to, or to approve the
acquisition of, credit institution subsidiaries of third-country institutions.
Article 9(3), dealing with reciprocity, as well as article 9(4), dealing with
discrimination, mentions lack of "effective market access" for EEC credit in94. Id. art. 9(2).
95. The limitation or suspension may not exceed three months. The Council of Ministers may,
in the light of the negotiations, decide by a qualified majority whether the measures shall be
continued. Id. art. 9(4).
96. See Gruson, Reciprocal National Treatment: Comparing EC Plan to Riegle-Garn Bill, 9
BANKING EXPANSION REP.,
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stitutions as a triggering event. The meaning of this term is not clear. "Market"
could be a geographical market or a product or service market. It is likely that
article 9(3) requires access by EEC credit institutions to the same product or
service markets in the third country to which non-EEC credit institutions have
access in the EEC and that the conditions for such access are not more difficult
in the third country than they are in the EEC. If such comparable effective market
access is denied by a third country, the competitive opportunities for EEC credit
institutions in that third country are not comparable with the competitive opportunities of credit institutions from that third country in the EEC. The reciprocity
provision of article 9(3) requires a comparison between the conditions prevailing
in the EEC and those prevailing in the third country with respect to market access
in order to determine whether the competitive opportunities are comparable. They
need not be the same; it suffices if they are comparable. The Second Banking
97
Directive, as adopted, rejects the concept of "mirror image reciprocity."
The national treatment provision of article 9(4) does not compare market
access and competitive opportunities granted by the third country with those
granted by the EEC, but compares the market access and the competitive opportunities granted by the non-EEC third country to its own credit institutions
and to EEC credit institutions. Market access and competitive opportunities
granted to both groups of credit institutions must be the same. If EEC credit
institutions are excluded from geographic markets in a third country (e.g., from
access to certain states of the United States) or from certain product or service
markets to which the third-country credit institutions have access, or if access to
such markets is more difficult for EEC credit institutions than for the thirdcountry credit institutions, or if EEC credit institutions are subject to more
stringent establishment requirements than the third-country credit institutions,
lack of effective market access would be a case of discrimination. It appears that
lack of effective market access as used in article 9(4) always constitutes denial
of national treatment and that, although both tests are mentioned cumulatively,
lack of effective market access does not add a new element to article 9(4). EEC
credit institutions cannot demand access to product or service markets to which
the third-country credit institutions have no access.
At any rate, the term "market access" as used in article 9 has a much broader
meaning than the first entry by a credit institution into a third country. EEC
officials have indicated that the term requires the existence of effective and not
only formal national treatment or reciprocal treatment and the realization of
meaningful access to the market in question, thereby covering discretionary
discrimination by the authorities in the third country.
It is doubtful whether U.S. banks meet the reciprocity requirement of reciprocal national treatment of article 9(3). EEC credit institutions do not have in the
United States "competitive opportunities" "comparable" to those afforded by

97. Gruson & Nikowitz, The Second Banking Directive, supra note I, at 229-30.
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the EEC to EEC credit institution subsidiaries of U.S. banks. For instance, the
right of an EEC credit institution subsidiary of a U.S. bank or bank holding
company freely to establish branches and do business throughout the EEC,
granted by the Second Banking Directive, must be measured against the restric98
tions on interstate banking by U.S. banks prevailing in the United States.
However, the fact that some states of the United States do not permit foreign
banks to establish branches in their territory99 (although all states would permit
a foreign bank to establish a subsidiary bank) and the fact that a foreign bank may
not establish a full branch in more than one state 1°° does not destroy reciprocity,
because U.S. banks are not permitted directly to establish branches freely
throughout the EEC. It is important to note in this connection that the Second
Banking Directive does not guarantee non-EEC credit institutions "effective
market access" or reciprocal treatment with respect to the establishment or
regulation of branches in the EEC, nor does it obligate the Member States to
grant licenses to subsidiaries of non-EEC banks or to permit non-EEC persons to
acquire banks in its territory. It is not clear what effect a Member State's denial
of effective market entry to non-EEC banks would have on the Commission's
rights under article 9.to
If a U.S. bank attempts to set up or acquire a credit institution subsidiary in a
Member State that permits its banks to underwrite corporate equity and debt
securities or to deal in securities, the Commission might well reach the conclusion that EEC credit institutions do not have comparable competitive opportunities in the United States, because a bank from that Member State could not
engage in such activities in the United States if it has a deposit-taking facility in
98. McFadden Act §§ 7(c), 8, 12 U.S.C. §§ 36, 81 (1988) (permitting a national bank to operate
branches only within its home state and only to the extent that a bank of the same state is permitted
to operate branches under state law); BHCA § 3(d) (Douglas Amendment), 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d)
(1988) (prohibiting a bank holding company or any of its subsidiaries from acquiring, directly or
indirectly, any interest in a bank chartered by a state other than the holding company's home state,
unless specifically authorized by the statutory laws of the state in which the target is located).
However, the restrictions of the Douglas Amendment are being rapidly torn down by state invitation
statutes. For instance, New York's statute permits out-of-state bank holding companies of any state
to enter New York on a reciprocal basis. California has enacted such a reciprocal nationwide
invitation statute, which became operative on Jan. 1, 1991. Thus, the two biggest banking markets
in the United States will soon be open to each other. For a discussion of invitation statutes, see Gruson
& Herndl, U.S. Bankprinzipien, supra note 15, at 8-11.
99. International Banking Act of 1978 § 4, 12 U.S.C. § 3102(a) (1988), provides that a foreign
bank may establish a federal branch or agency in any state only if the establishment of a branch or
agency by a foreign bank is not prohibited by state law. Some states prohibit foreign banks from
establishing either branches or agencies within their borders, others allow only agencies but not
branches, and a third group of states allows both branches and agencies.
100. International Banking Act § 5, 12 U.S.C. § 3103 (1988), requires a foreign bank that has or
acquires an unrestricted (deposit-taking) branch or bank subsidiary in the United States to select the
state in which such unrestricted branch or bank subsidiary is located as its "IBA home state" and
prohibits such foreign bank from operating an unrestricted deposit-taking branch outside its IBA
home state.
101. See Gruson & Nikowitz, The Second Banking Directive, supra note 1, at 230-32.
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the United States. This result is mandated by the Glass-Steagall Act, which has
become a focal point of the reciprocity discussion. 102 Recently, however, underwriting and dealing have been permitted to nonbank subsidiaries of U.S. and
foreign bank holding companies subject to certain restrictions. 10 3 The GlassSteagall restrictions equally apply to U.S. banks and non-U.S. banks, and therefore cannot trigger the retaliatory responses to discrimination of article 9(4) of
the Second Banking Directive.
The competition commissioner, Sir Leon Brittan, has repeatedly stated that
"although neither the Glass-Steagall 10 4 nor the McFadden Act 10 5 discriminated
directly against European banks, efforts to get round the rules indirectly put
third-country banks at a disadvantage." 10 6 Since those banking restrictions are
based on fundamental U.S. policy decisions that are at least equally limiting to
U.S. banks, the examples given in Sir Leon Brittan's criticism can only be
instances of the lack of reciprocal treatment, and not instances of the lack of
national treatment; thus, they do not give rise to the more severe consequences
of article 9(4).
Furthermore, there is no reciprocity between the wide powers of EEC credit
institutions to invest in nonbanking subsidiaries and the prohibition imposed on
U.S. banks and bank holding companies against investments in commercial or
industrial companies subject to narrow exemptions' 0 7 for investments in companies engaged in activities "closely related to banking" and investments in up
to 5 percent of the voting shares of another company. '0 8 Again, foreign banks are
not being discriminated against in this area. Indeed, in the area of investments in
09
commercial companies, foreign banks have more leeway than U.S. banks. 1
Two issues should be noted with respect to the United States. First, the United
States has a unique "dual" banking system that leaves foreign banks the choice
between obtaining a license under the law of a particular state or under federal
law. The requirements for establishing and operating state-chartered banks are
different under the law of each state. Consequently, a reciprocity or even national
102. See supra note 24. The Glass-Steagall restrictions apply to foreign banks operating a branch
or a bank subsidiary in the United States by virtue of the International Banking Act of 1978. Gruson
& Nikowitz, The Second Banking Directive, supra note 1, at 233 n. 144; Gruson, Investment in
Foreign Equity Securities, supra note 46, at 489.
103. As to these so-called "Section 20 subsidiaries," see Gruson & Herndl, U.S. Bankprinzipien,
supra note 15, at 14-15.
104. For a discussion of the Glass-Steagall Act in the context of reciprocity, see Gruson &
Nikowitz, The Second Banking Directive, supra note 1, at 232-35.
105. For a discussion of the McFadden Act and the U.S. restrictions on interstate banking in the
context of reciprocity, see Gruson & Nikowitz, The Second Banking Directive, supra note 1, at
235-37.
106. Fin. Times, Mar. 24, 1990, at 2.
107. Gruson, Investments in Foreign Equity Securities, supra note 46, at 454.
108. See Gruson & Nikowitz, The Second Banking Directive, supra note 1, at 237-39.
109. 12 C.F.R. 211.23 (1990) (Regulation K). See generally Gruson, Investment in Foreign
Equity Securities, supra note 46.
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treatment test would have to look, in the case of a national bank, to U.S. federal
law and, in the case of state-chartered banks, to the state in which the institution
seeking authorization in the EEC is chartered." Therefore, a retaliatory response under article 9(4) could only extend to national banks or to banks from
the particular state in question. Applications by New York banks or by national
banks cannot be suspended because a particular state X discriminates against
EEC banks.
Second, U.S banking laws permit U.S. banks, their foreign banking subsidiaries, and U.S. bank holding companies to engage outside the United States
only in banking and in other, carefully circumscribed, activities that, in the view
of the U.S. banking authorities, are closely related to banking or do not involve
undue risk."' Although the powers of U.S. banks abroad are somewhat broader
than in the United States, EEC credit institution subsidiaries of U.S. banks or
bank holding companies, for instance, may not generally underwrite, distribute,
or deal in debt and equity securities in the EEC, except that they may underwrite
debt or equity securities up to a very small commitment not exceeding $2 million
or 20 percent of the issuer's capital and surplus or voting shares. 1 1 2 Another
example is that U.S. banks may not engage in the EEC directly or indirectly in
property insurance. Thus, European credit institution subsidiaries of U.S. banks
cannot use all of the universal banking powers that may be given to them under
the single banking license pursuant to the Second Banking Directive. U.S. banks
therefore do not have substantially greater competitive opportunities in the EEC
banking market than EEC credit institutions have in the United States. This
self-restraint imposed on U.S. banks blunts the argument of lack of reciprocity.
The limitations and suspensions that may be imposed under article 9(4) apply
only to pending or future requests for authorizations and acquisitions of holdings.
A decision of the Commission under article 9(4) does not have retroactive effect.
Credit institution subsidiaries of non-EEC banks that have already been authorized to do business in a Member State before the Commission has taken the
decision to refuse future authorizations with respect to the applicable third country will not be subject to the retaliatory measures of article 9 of the Second
Banking Directive, but will be grandfathered and will continue to benefit from
3
the mutual recognition of their licenses. "
110. Application of this concept is somewhat more complicated because, by virtue of federal law,
certain state laws apply to national banks, and because federal law, by virtue of the United States
Constitution, is also part of the law of each state.
!11. 12 C.F.R. 211.5 (1990) (Regulation K). The restrictions of BHCA § 4, 12 U.S.C. § 1843
(1988), on nonbanking activities of U.S. bank holding companies apply on a worldwide basis. See
also the limitations for so-called Edge Act corporations under 12 C.F.R. 211.4 (1990) (Regulation
K). See Gruson, Investments in Foreign Equity Securities, supra note 46.
112. 12 C.F.R. 211.5(d)(13) (1990) (Regulation K); see the proposed amendments to Regulation
K, 55 Fed. Reg. 32,424 (1990), which would increase these amounts.
113. Second Banking Directive, supra note 1, art. 9(4), last para. Compare the proposed Fair
Trade in Financial Services Act of 1990, S. 2028, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., CONG. REC. S479 (daily
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In general, the imposition of actual sanctions against U.S. banks pursuant to
article 9(4) because of discriminatory actions against EEC banks in the U.S.
market is not likely, as it is generally recognized that the United States follows
the principle of national treatment of foreign banks and does not discriminate
against foreign credit institutions.' 14 It is therefore widely expected that the
Second Banking Directive, as adopted, will not give rise to major obstacles for
U.S. banks establishing or acquiring subsidiaries in the EEC after 1992.115
However, in evaluating the effect of article 9 on non-EEC banks, and especially
on U.S. banks, one must keep in mind that the language of article 9 is broad
enough to allow the EEC to take aggressive positions if a third country's treatment of EEC credit institutions is perceived to be discriminatory or nonreciprocal
and if the political climate in the EEC requires such an approach.
III. The Directive on Consolidated Supervision
The Directive on Consolidated Supervision" 16 requires the consolidated supervision of the financial condition of a credit institution, including those credit
or financial institutions in which the parent credit institution holds a participation,
even though such credit or financial institution is located in other Member States.
Consolidated supervision essentially means that the authority supervising the
parent credit institution must apply the financial data of the whole group in
ed. Jan. 29, 1990) and S14610 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1990), introduced on Jan. 29, 1990, by Senators
Riegle and Gan (the Riegle-Garn Bill), which would also make the existing U.S. standard of
national treatment subject to a reciprocity requirement that is, however, not limited to the restriction
of the entry of banks from discriminating countries. The Riegle-Gam Bill does not grandfather
existing U.S. operations of foreign banks, but would freeze the status quo of activities of foreign
banks from discriminating countries. See generally Gruson, ReciprocalNational Treatment, supra
note 96.
114. There are, however, some discriminatory barriers against foreign banks in the United States.
See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: COMPETITIVE CONCERNS OF FOREIGN FINANCIAL FIRMS IN JAPAN, THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND THE UNITED STATES 21-25 (1988)

(discussing exceptions to the rule of national treatment of foreign banks, including, among others, the
Primary Dealers Act of 1988, 22 U.S.C. § 5341 et seq. (1988), restrictions by state insurance
regulations on issuance by foreign banks of reinsurance standby letters of credit, and limitations on
access to the Fed-wire Overdraft Capacity). Foreign banks are subject to the burdensome provisions
of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-I (1988), because the Securities and
Exchange Commission treats foreign banks as investment companies whereas U.S. banks are exempted from this Act. Gruson & Jackson, Issuance of Securities by ForeignBanks andthe Investment
Company Act of 1940, 1980 U. ILL. L.F. 185, and New York State Bar Ass'n, Int'l Law and Practice
Section, Comm. on Int'l Banking, Sec., & Fin. Transactions, Report on Issuance of Securities by
Foreign Banks and Their Finance Subsidiaries Under the Investment Company Act of 1940 and
Rule 6c-9 (E.T. Patrikis, Chairman; E. Gewirtz & M. Gruson, Reporters), 1988/89 N.Y. INT'L L.
REV. 29.
115. See U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM., THE EFFECTS OF GREATER ECONOMIC INTEGRATION WITHIN THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ON THE UNITED STATES, REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS OF
THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND THE COMM. ON FINANCE OF THE INVESTIGATION

No. 332-267 UNDER SECTION 332 OF THE TARIFF ACT OF 1930, JULY 1989, at 5-10 to -13.
116. Supra note 47.
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monitoring compliance by the credit institution with its supervisory standards
(such as solvency ratio, lending limits, and restrictions on investments by credit
institutions in the nonbank sector). Consolidated supervision must be distinguished from the principle of Home Member State supervision as provided for
branches in the Second Banking Directive. The consolidated supervision shall be
the responsibility of the competent authorities in the Home Member State where
the parent credit institution has its head office. " 7 Where appropriate, supervision
by the Home Member State shall be exercised in consultation with the competent
authorities of the Member States of the subsidiary institutions, so that distortion
of competition between the consolidated group of credit institutions and the
domestic credit institutions of the countries in which the members of the group
are established will be avoided.' 18 However, the Directive on Consolidated Supervision does not preclude the concurrent supervision of the individual credit
institution subsidiary by the competent authorities where such subsidiary is authorized. 119
The concept of the Directive on Consolidated Supervision is that a realistic
assessment of a credit institution's financial status should take into consideration
all credit and financial institutions in which the credit institution holds a participation. In the same way as participations in the nonbanking sector,' 20 equity
investments in credit or financial institutions require particular attention, because
they may affect the financial stability and soundness of the credit institution if the
subsidiary credit or financial institution runs into financial difficulties (contagion
risk). Equity investments also constitute a long-term freezing of the assets of the
investing credit institution. 121 Only consolidated supervision prevents a credit
institution from escaping compliance with supervisory standards by moving assets or activities into subsidiaries. For all these reasons, the credit institution and
the credit or financial institution in which the parent credit institution holds a
participation shall be supervised by the parent credit institution's Home Member
State.
The Directive on Consolidated Supervision only applies where a credit institution, i.e., a deposit-taking institution, is the ultimate parent company.1 22 As
said above, consolidated supervision extends to credit and financial institutions
in which a credit institution has a participation. The Directive on Consolidated
Supervision uses a definition of "financial institution" that is slightly different
from the one used in the Second Banking Directive.' 23 "Financial institution" is

117. Directive on Consolidated Supervision, supra note 47, art. 3(3), second "whereas" clause.
118. Id.
119. Id. art. 3(4), fourth "whereas" clause; cf. Second Banking Directive, supra note 1,
art. 18(2), and supra notes 69-78 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 46 & 47 and accompanying text.
121. See Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 1, at II 3(b).
122. Directive on Consolidated Supervision, supra note 47, arts. 3(l), 1, indent 1.
123. See supra note 70.
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defined as an "undertaking, not being a credit institution, whose principal activity is to grant credit facilities (including guarantees), to acquire participations
or to make investments."' 124 "Participation" means ownership, directly or indirectly, of 25 percent or more of the capital of another credit or financial
institution. 125 In cases of participations in the 25 percent to 50 percent range,
there is discretion as to whether and how consolidation should be effected. 126
Consolidation is mandatory, however, if the participation is beyond 50 percent
and the authorities of the Home Member State of
the parent credit institution
1 27
shall require either full or pro rata consolidation.
Consolidated supervision is not limited to participations in credit and financial
institutions located in the EEC. However, an exemption applies to credit institutions or financial institutions located in a non-EEC country where there are
legal impediments to the transfer of the necessary information.' 28 Application of
the principle of supervision on a consolidated basis to credit institutions whose
parent companies have their head offices in non-EEC countries and to credit
institutions situated in non-EEC countries whose parent credit institutions have a
head office in an EEC Member State shall be made possible by virtue of reciprocal bilateral agreements to be entered into between the competent authorities of
the Member States and the non-EEC countries concerned. 129 Within the EEC, to
enable the Home Member State to perform the consolidated supervision, all
Member States are directed to ensure that the necessary information for consol0
idated supervision can be exchanged. 13
Following the implementation of the Directive on Consolidated Supervision
into the national laws of the Member States, it was decided that the consolidated
supervision of credit institutions should be expanded to all banking groups,
including those whose ultimate parent undertaking is not a credit institution. 131
This shall be achieved by the Proposal for a Council Directive Relating to the
Supervision of Credit Institutions on a Consolidated Basis replacing Directive
124. Directive on Consolidated Supervision, supra note 47, art. 1,indent 2.
125. Id. art. 1,indent 3.
126. Id. art. 4(2), (3). The relevant Member State of the parent credit institution can determine
the method of consolidation, if in the opinion of the competent authorities of such Member State a
situation of effective control exists between the parent credit institution and the subsidiary credit or
financial institution. Pending further coordination, the competent authorities in the Member State in
which the parent credit institution has its head office can agree with the competent authorities for the
credit or financial institution in which the parent credit institution holds a 25 percent to 50 percent
participation that consolidation is not required in a specific case. If in the opinion of the competent
authorities of such Member State a situation of effective control between the parent and subsidiary
does not exist, such competent authorities shall determine whether and how consolidation is to be
effected. Id.
127.

Id. art. 4(1).

128. Id. art. 3(2), indent 2.
129. Id. art. 6.
130. Id. art. 5.

131. See the definition of a bank holding company in the BHCA § 2(a)(l), 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1)
(1988).
SPRING 1991

26

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

83/350/EEC (the Replacing Consolidation Directive). 132 The Replacing Consolidation Directive will provide that not only credit institutions that have participations in other credit or financial institutions, but also financial holding companies, defined as financial institutions of which at least one33subsidiary is a credit
institution, are to be supervised on a consolidated basis. 1
The Replacing Consolidation Directive proposes to amend the term "financial
institution" as used in the Directive on Consolidated Supervision, to bring its
132. [Not yet published] [hereinafter Replacing Consolidation Directive], tenth "whereas"
clause, art. 10.
133. Id. arts. 1, 2, 3(1), (2). "Financial holding company" means a "financial institution the
subsidiary undertakings (one or more) of which are either exclusively or mainly credit institutions or
financial institutions, one at least of these subsidiaries being a credit institution." Id. art. 1, indent 3.
Thus, a financial holding company and a credit institution is subject to consolidated supervision if it
has participations in other credit institutions or financial institutions, whereas a financial institution
becomes a financial holding company subject to consolidated supervision if it has financial institution
and credit institution subsidiaries.
The Replacing Consolidation Directive, supra note 132, also introduces the concept of a "mixedactivity holding company," which is defined as a "parent undertaking other than a financial holding
company whose subsidiaries include at least one credit institution." Id. art. 1, indent 4. Consolidated
supervision does not extend to mixed-activity financial holding companies; Member States shall only
require mixed-activity holding companies and their subsidiaries to supply information that would be
relevant for the purposes of supervising credit institutions that are subsidiaries of such mixed-activity
holding companies. Id. art. 6(1).
The term "subsidiary" is defined in the Replacing Consolidation Directive, supra note 132, art. 1,
indent 8, by reference to arts. I and 2 of the Seventh Council Directive, supra note 58. See supra
note 60. The Replacing Consolidation Directive reduces the ownership threshold in the definition of
"participation" from 25 percent to 20 percent. "Participation" would mean ownership, direct or
indirect, of 20 percent or more of the voting rights or capital of another undertaking. Replacing
Consolidation Directive, supra note 132, art. 1, indent 6.
As in the Directive on Consolidated Supervision, the Replacing Consolidation Directive will
permit the Member States charged with exercising consolidated supervision to exclude a credit or
financial institution from consolidation if such institution is situated in a non-EEC country where
there are legal impediments to the transfer of the necessary information. Id. art. 3(3), indent 1.
Where the parent undertaking is a credit institution, supervision on a consolidated basis shall be
exercised by the Member State that authorized it. Id. art. 4(1). The expansion of supervision on a
consolidated basis to financial holding companies requires rules determining the Member State that
must exercise such supervision. Where the parent undertaking of a credit institution is a financial
holding company, consolidated supervision shall be exercised by the Member State that authorized
the credit institution. Id. art. 4(2). However, where a financial holding company has credit institution
subsidiaries in more than one Member State, including the Member State where the financial holding
company has been set up, supervision on a consolidated basis shall be undertaken by the Member
State where the financial holding company has been set up. If there is no credit institution subsidiary
in the Member State where the financial holding company has been set up, the Member States
concerned will have to reach an agreement as to which Member State shall exercise consolidated
supervision. In the absence of such agreement, the supervising Member State is selected on the basis
of the largest balance sheet or the first date of authorization of the credit institution subsidiaries. Id.
Consolidation for the purposes of supervision may take different forms. Full consolidation is
required of credit institutions and financial institutions that are subsidiaries of the parent undertaking
or over which the latter effectively exercises a dominant influence. Pro rata consolidation may be
prescribed in the cases where the responsibility of the undertaking holding the participation is limited
to its part of the capital, because of the responsibilities of other shareholders whose solvency is
considered satisfactory. Id. art. 5(1). In other cases or where a significant influence is exercised in
fact, the competent authorities shall determine whether and how consolidation is to be carried out.
They may permit or require the equity method to be used. Id. art. 5(3).
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definition in line with the Second Banking Directive. "Financial institution" is
proposed to mean an undertaking other than a credit institution whose principal
activity is to acquire and hold participations or to exercise one or more of the
operations included in numbers 2 to 12 of the Annex of the Second Banking
Directive. 134 Thus, all undertakings engaging in activities set out in the Annex
to the Second Banking Directive will qualify for inclusion in the consolidated
supervision.
In contrast to the principle of Home Member State control provided for branches
of credit institutions, subsidiaries of credit institutions in other Member States would,
under the replacing Consolidation Directive, in the same way as under the Directive
on Consolidated Supervision, remain subject to the regular banking supervision of the
Member State where they are authorized in addition to being subject to the consolidated supervision of the parent credit institution. 135 However, by virtue of bilateral
agreements between the authorities of the Member States involved, such regular
banking supervision of the subsidiary credit institution can be delegated to the authorities supervising the parent credit institution. 36 In addition to the inclusion of a
credit institution subsidiary in the consolidated supervision of its parent undertaking,
such credit institution and its credit and financial institution subsidiaries are also
subject to supervision on a subconsolidated basis.
Until further harmonization of the capital requirements relating to market
risks, a financial institution in which a credit institution of a financial holding
company holds a participation can be excluded from consolidated supervision if
such subsidiary financial institution is involved in activities principally subject to
market risks and such subsidiary financial institution is currently subject to
particular market risk rules of supervision in its Home Member State. 137 Similarly, the trading book of a credit or financial institution in which a credit
institution or a financial holding company holds a participation may be excluded
from consolidation. ' 38 Such an exception might theoretically result in investment
firms being excluded from consolidation until the Capital Adequacy Directive, 139
harmonizing the supervisory rules for market risks, is adopted.

134. Id. art. 1, indent 2, seventh "whereas" clause.
135. Id. art. 3(8). Consolidated supervision is supervision "on the basis of the consolidation of
[the] financial situation" of the consolidated group. Id. art. 3(1), (2). Consolidated supervision, of
course, is closely related to the regular banking supervision of the individual credit and financial
institutions. Article 3(6) of the Replacing Consolidation Directive, supra note 132, provides that the
competent authorities shall ensure the existence of adequate control mechanisms in all credit institutions and financial institutions included in the scope of the consolidated supervision.
136. Id. art. 3(9).
137. Id. art. 3(3) indent 4.
138. Id. "Trading book" is defined as the proprietary positions in transferable securities or
derivative instruments, which are taken on by a credit or financial institution in order to benefit from
actual or expected differences between their buying and selling prices, or in order to hedge other
elements of the trading book. Id. art. 1, indent 10; Capital Adequacy Directive, supra note 38, art. 2,
indent 2; see infra note 236 and accompanying text.
139. See supra note 38, and infra notes 222-36 and accompanying text.
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The Solvency Ratio Directive1 40 and, consequently, the Own Funds Directive' 4' apply to the consolidated supervision of the whole group, even to those
affiliates that are engaged in securities activities involving market risks rather
than credit risks. This dual regulation results in competitive disadvantages for
universal banks, which have to maintain capital minimums to cover both credit
risks (pursuant to the Solvency Ratio Directive) and market risks (pursuant to the
Capital Adequacy Directive). Supervision of control of large exposures is proposed on a consolidated basis in accordance with the Proposal for a Council
Directive on Monitoring and Controlling
Large Exposures of Credit Institutions
42
(the Large Exposures Directive). 1
IV. The Solvency Ratio Directive
The aim of the Solvency Ratio Directive1 4 3 is to ensure that every credit institution authorized under the Second Banking Directive has sufficient and sound
capitalization to withstand losses caused by the realization of risks inherent to the
banking business. The Solvency Ratio Directive represents the EEC's version of
the capital adequacy rules of the Basle Committee on Banking Regulations and
Supervisory Practices that were proposed by the so-called Cooke Committee (the
Basle Agreement). 144 The Solvency Ratio Directive requires the Member States
to adopt the measures necessary to comply with its provisions by January 1,
1991,145 which in turn will satisfy the obligations of the Basle Agreement.
The Solvency Ratio Directive is applicable to credit institutions. If a credit
institution is a parent undertaking and is to be included in the consolidated supervision of a banking group, the solvency ratio is calculated on a consolidated basis
in accordance with the provisions of the
Directive on Consolidated Supervision
46
and the Bank Accounting Directive. 1
The Solvency Ratio Directive addresses only the credit risk incurred by a
credit institution. The so-called market risk inherent in the securities activities of
140. Solvency Ratio Directive, supra note 36, art. 3(3); see Replacing Consolidation Directive,
supra note 132, art. 3(5).
141. See supra note 36.
142. COM - XV/286/89 - Rev. I [hereinafter Draft Large Exposures Directive], art. 5(2); see
Replacing Consolidation Directive, supra note 132, art. 3(5).
143. Supra note 36.
144. The Basle Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices, International
Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards (July 1988) [hereinafter Basle Agreement]. For further discussion of the Basle Agreement, see Norton, The Work of the Basle Supervisors
Committee on Bank Capital Adequacy and the July 1988 Report on InternationalConvergence of
Capital Measurements and CapitalStandards, 23 INT'L LAw. 245 (1989).
145. Solvency Ratio Directive, supra note 36, art. 12(1). The supervision of a bank's credit risk
by the Solvency Ratio Directive, however, must go hand in hand with the capital adequacy rules for
market risks that will be contained in the proposed Capital Adequacy Directive, supra note 38;
Solvency Ratio Directive, supra note 36, tenth & eleventh "whereas" clauses.
146. Solvency Ratio Directive, supra note 36, art. 3(3); Council Directive of 8 December 1986
on the Annual Accounts and Consolidated Accounts of Banks and Other Financial Institutions,
86/635/EEC, O.J. (No. L 372) 1 (1986) [hereinafter the Bank Accounting Directive].
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credit institutions will be dealt with separately in the Capital Adequacy Directive. 147 However, contrary to the common practice of current national banking
supervision, the credit risk resulting from certain off-balance-sheet items is taken
into account by computing the solvency ratio. 148
The Solvency Ratio Directive provides for the following formula to compute
149
a credit institution's solvency ratio:
Solvency Ratio =
own funds
risk-adjusted assets and off-balance-sheet items

The minimum solvency ratio shall be 8 percent of a credit institution's own
funds. 150
The numerator of the formula consists of the "own funds" of a credit institution as outlined by the Own Funds Directive. 15' The own funds consist of
capital elements basically similar to the ones in the Basle Agreement and the
risk-based U.S. Capital Adequacy Guidelines. 152
The formula's denominator is composed of a credit institution's risk adjusted
assets and off-balance-sheet items. The purpose of "risk adjustment" is to take
into account the general risks associated with the various assets and off-balancesheet items of a credit institution. This adjustment will be achieved by the
following procedure: The degrees of credit risk, expressed as percentage weights
of 0, 10, 20, 50 or 100 percent, depending on the debtor, are assigned to each
item. In a second step, the balance sheet value of each asset will be multiplied
by the relevant percentage weight to arrive at the risk-adjusted value. 153 The
same method is used in the Basle Agreement and the U.S. Guidelines.
The similarities among the Solvency Ratio Directive, the Basle Agreement,
and the U.S. Guidelines extend also to the assignment of categories of asset
items to the various credit risk levels. For example, a loan to an individual for the
purchase of residential property fully secured by mortgages on the property in
question would be assigned a 50 percent weight under all three rules. 1 54 An
important difference, however, exists in the treatment of loans backed by mortgages on commercial property. Under the rule of the Solvency Ratio Directive,
German, Danish, and Greek banks will, as an exception, be allowed to apply,
147. See infra notes 222-36 and accompanying text.
148. Solvency Ratio Directive, supra note 36, annex 1-III.
149. Id. arts. 4, 5.
150. Id. art. 10(1).
151. Id. art. 4; see infra notes 163-83 and accompanying text.
152. Risk-Based Capital Guidelines of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 12 C.F.R.
325, app. A (1990), adopted in 54 Fed. Reg. 11,500 (1989); Capital Adequacy Guidelines of the
Federal Reserve System, 12 C.F.R. 208, app. A (1990), 12 C.F.R. 225, app. A-B (1990), adopted
in 54 Fed. Reg. 4,186 (1989); Risk-Based Capital Guidelines of the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, 12 C.F.R. 3, app. A (1990), adopted in 54 Fed. Reg. 46,168 (1989). For further discussion, see Norton, InternationalConvergence of Bank Supervisory Practices:The New U.S. Bank
Capital Adequacy Standards, 5 J. INT'L Bus. L. 208 (1989).
153. Solvency Ratio Directive, supra note 36, art. 5(1).
154. Id. art. 6(1)(c)(1); 12 C.F.R. pt. 208, app. A, attachment III, category 3 (1990); Basle
Agreement, supra note 144, annex 2.
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until January 1, 1996, a 50 percent weighting to such assets, provided that the
amount of the loan does not exceed 60 percent of the value of the property in
question. 155 The German, Danish, and Greek banks therefore have a temporary
advantage over EEC credit institutions from other EEC countries and U.S.
of assets. 156
banks, which have to apply a 100 percent weighting to that category
The reason behind this exception is the existence of a great number of specialized
credit institutions in these countries engaged in the business of making mortgagebacked loans. The exception gives them time to adjust their capital coverage to
their full 8 percent level within the transitional period.
The way the Solvency Ratio Directive achieves the incorporation of certain
off-balance-sheet items into the formula's denominator is also similar to the
approach used by the Basle Agreement and the U.S. Guidelines. Each item is
assigned to one of four categories ranging from full risk, as, for example,
acceptances or guarantees having the character of credit substitutes, through
medium and medium-low to low risk, as, for example, undrawn credit facilities
with an original maturity of up to one year.' 57 The incorporation takes place in
three states. First, the items are grouped according to the above categories. Then
their face value is adjusted such that the full value of the full risk items,
50 percent of the medium risk, 20 percent of the medium-low risk, and 0 percent
of the low risk items' value is taken into account. The last stage is the multiplication of the adjusted values by the risk weight attributed58to the counterparties
involved in accordance with the treatment of asset items. 1
The credit risk resulting from certain interest-rate contracts and foreignexchange contracts is addressed by two alternative methods. A credit institution
is free to choose either of these methods, subject to the consent of its supervisory
59
authority. '
The first alternative is the "marking to market" approach, in which the current
market value of interest-rate contracts and foreign-exchange contracts is added to a
figure for potential future credit exposure and the sum of both is multiplied by the risk
weightings allocated to the relevant counterparty in accordance with article 6 of the
Solvency Ratio Directive. 160 The potential future credit exposure is calculated by
multiplying the notional principal amounts of such contracts with a rate from 0 percent
to 5 percent, depending on residual maturity and type of contract. 161
The alternative method, called "original exposure" approach, is based on a
multiplication of the notional principal amount of the contracts with rates ranging

155.
156.
C.F.R.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Solvency Ratio Directive, supra note 36, art. 11(4).
Such loans are normally placed in the "all other assets" category. See id. art. 6(l)(d)(7); 12
208, app. A, attachment III, category 4 (1990).
Solvency Ratio Directive, supra note 36, art. 6(2), annex 1.
Id. art. 6(2).
Id. art. 6(3), annex II.
Id. annex II.
Id.
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from 0.5 percent to 5 percent depending on original maturity
and type of contract
62
and an allocation of the appropriate risk weighting.'
V. The Own Funds Directive
Own funds of a credit institution can serve to absorb losses and therefore
provide a yardstick for the regulatory authorities of the solvency of a credit
institution; 163 they also provide a measure for the possible business volume. Own
funds, especially equity, are typically the most expensive funds for a company.
Therefore, the question of to what extent equity substitutes are being recognized
as own funds is of importance for the competitiveness of a credit institution.
Nevertheless, the Own Funds Directive defines only a maximum list of such
items and qualifying amounts to be included in the own funds calculation,
leaving it to the discretion of each Member State to use all or some of such items
or to adopt lower ceilings for the qualifying amounts,64 thus permitting each
Member State to influence the competitive position of its credit institutions. 165
Own funds serve as the reference basis not only for the solvency ratio but for
a number of other supervisory standards like the capital adequacy, the limitations
on large exposures, and the limitations of participations in nonbank entities.
A credit institution's own funds consist of its capital elements basically similar
to the ones in the Basle Agreement and the risk-based U.S. Capital Adequacy
Guidelines. 166 According to the Own Funds Directive, the Member State may
67
recognize the following items to be included in the own funds calculation'
whereby a distinction is made between original own funds and additional own
168
funds:
(i) paid-up capital plus share premium accounts,
(ii) reserves,
(iii) revaluation reserves,
(iv) funds for general banking risks,
(v) value adjustments,
(vi) certain other funds and securities, fixed-term cumulative preferential
shares and subordinated debt,' 69 and
(vii) commitments of the members of credit institutions set up as cooperative
societies and of the borrowers of certain institutions organized as funds.

162.
163.
164.
165.
German
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id.
Own Funds Directive, supra note 36, third "whereas" clause.
Id., fifth "whereas" clause.
See Die Welt, June 16, 1990, discussing the transformation of the Own Fund Directive into
Law.
12 C.F.R. pt. 208, app. A (1990); 12 C.F.R. 225, app. A (1990).
For details, see Own Funds Directive, supra note 36, art. 2.
Id. sixth "whereas" clause.
For details, see id. arts. 2, 4(3).
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Further, the Own Funds Directive provides for certain limits on additional own
funds, namely those mentioned in (iii) and (v) to (vii) above. 170 These limitations
on the amount of additional own funds or "soft capital," by comparison to the
original own funds or "core capital" mentioned in (i) and (ii) above, mean that
the total amount of soft capital taken into account may not exceed 100 percent of
the amount of core capital whereas subordinated loans and fixed-term preferential shares may not exceed 50 percent of the core capital. 171 This restriction
reflects the fact that items constituting additional own funds are not of the same
72
nature as those constituting original own funds.'
Basically, capital elements are grouped into an array that is, with one noteworthy deviation, comparable to the two-tiered arrangement of the United States
Capital Adequacy Guidelines and the Basle Agreement. 173 Original own funds
corresponds to what is known in the United States as Tier 1capital and additional
own funds corresponds to what is known as Tier 2 capital. The deviation lies in
the introduction of one type of capital that is assigned neither to Tier 1 nor Tier
2 capital. 174 The untiered capital is composed of "funds for general banking
risks" 75 (mentioned in (iv) above). It includes the amounts a credit institution
76
decides to put aside to cover general banking risks. 1
These funds constitute a separate category insofar as they may, as a general
rule, be included in own funds without a limit like Tier I capital items, but,
unlike Tier I capital items, they do not contribute towards the sum of capital
setting the maximum size of Tier 2 capital. 177 However, this selective treatment
of funds for banking risks is only temporary. The final decision on whether this
item will be treated as Tier 1 or Tier 2 capital will be made by the Council based
on a proposal, which the Commission must furnish within six months of the
Directive's implementation. 178
The practical result of this approach is that, as there is no restriction on the
nature of the funds being set aside for general banking risks, credit institutions
subject only to the EEC rules may be able to include capital items other than
equity and disclosed reserves in their capital base and thus have a distinct competitive advantage over non-EEC banks doing business in the EEC. However, as
the use of openly accounted reserves-like the "funds for general banking
risks--to compensate losses from the current banking business might influence
negatively the standing of a credit institution, it is doubtful whether credit
170. Id. art. 6.
171. Id.
172. Id. tenth "whereas" clause.
173. 12 C.F.R. pt. 208, app. A, 11 (1990); 12 C.F.R. 225, app. A, I1(1990).
174. Own Funds Directive, supra note 36, art. 6(2).
175. Id. art. 2(1), (4).
176. Bank Accounting Directive, supra note 146, art. 38(I).
177. Own Funds Directive, supra note 36, art. 6(2).
178. Id. Note that the Own Funds Directive is adopted but not yet implemented by the laws of the
Member States.
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institutions will in fact use the "funds for general banking risks" for the calculation of own funds.
Specific items, which in fact could not serve as loss or insolvency protection,
must be deducted from the own funds. Under the Own Funds Directive, these
items are the book value of own shares held by the credit institution, certain
intangible assets, material losses of the current fiscal year, and certain holdings
in other credit or financial institutions exceeding 10 percent of such other institutions' capital. 179
An interesting difference to the U.S. Guidelines is that the term "intangible
assets" encompasses, besides goodwill, certain formation expenses as defined
by national law of the Member States, payments on account, or concessions,
patents, licenses, trademarks, and similar rights if they were acquired for valuable consideration. 180 According to the U.S. Guidelines, only goodwill has to be
deducted as a matter of general policy.' 8' The rules requiring the deduction of
holdings in other banking or financial institutions are also different
under the
82
Own Funds Directive and the U.S. Capital Adequacy Guidelines. 1
The Own Funds Directive requires that the Member States bring into force the
necessary national laws and regulations together with the measures implementing
the Solvency Ratio Directive' 8 3 by January 1, 1993, at the latest.
VI. The Large Exposures Recommendation and
the Draft Large Exposures Directive
The Commission Recommendation on Monitoring and Controlling Large Exposures of Credit Institutions (the Large Exposures Recommendation) 84 is intended to prevent excessive exposure concentrations to a single creditor or group
of creditors. As a recommendation, it does not obligate the Member States to
implement its provisions, but is still expected to have persuasive force and
political weight. The Commission's reason for choosing a recommendation
rather than a binding directive was that by way of a recommendation the banking
system can be adjusted more gradually at the discretion of each Member State.
A directive, on the other hand, requires the Member States to implement its
provisions by a given date.

179. Id. art. 2(1), indents 9-12. Indent 13 of art. 2(1) requires the deductions from own funds
of certain holdings in other credit or financial institutions amounting to less than 10 percent of such
other institutions' capital if the holdings in all other credit or financial institutions exceed 10 percent
of the investing credit institution's capital.
180. Id. art. 2(1), indent 10; Bank Accounting Directive, supra note 146, art. 4(9); Fourth
Council Directive of 25 July 1978, 78/660/EEC, O.J. (No. L 222) 11 (1978), art. 9(B), (C)(1)
[hereinafter Fourth Council Directive].
181. 12 C.F.R. pt. 208, app. A, II B, clauses (i) & (1) (1990).
182. 12 C.F.R. pt. 208, app. A, II B, clauses (ii), (iii), 2 & 3 (1990).
183. Own Funds Directive supra note 36, art. 9(1).
184. 87/62/EEC, O.J. (No. L 33) 10 (1987) [hereinafter Large Exposures Recommendation].
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The annex to the Large Exposures Recommendation contains a detailed outline on
what is thought to be a "large exposure" and on how such exposures should be
controlled. 185 A "large exposure" is defined as an exposure being equal to or exceeding 15 percent of a credit institution's own funds. 186 The annex proposes an
amount equaling 40 percent of the own funds as the maximum acceptable amount of
exposure to a single client or group of clients. 187 The total of a credit institution's large
exposures should not be more than 800 percent of its own funds.
188 These limits
89
1
should be exceeded only under extraordinary circumstances.
Supervision should be achieved through the introduction of a reporting requirement for large exposures. It is suggested that Member States should require
EEC credit institutions to report any large exposure to the competent Home
Member State authorities at least once a year. 190 In regard to branches of nonEEC credit institutions, the annex proposes that the branch's large exposures
should be reported to the authorities of the Host Member State.' 9'
Meanwhile, the Commission of the EEC has published the Draft Large Exposures Directive.' 92 The mandatory imposition of large exposure limits by way
of a directive is based on the premises that the first phase of adapting banking
supervision to a common standard is now over, that controlling the exposures of
a credit institution is an integral part of prudential supervision, and that excessive
concentration of exposures to a single client or group of connected clients might
result in an unacceptable danger of loss. The mandatory implementation of the
exposure limits for all credit institutions by way of a directive is intended to
neutralize distortion of competition by differing large exposure limitations in the
93
various Member States.'
The Draft Large Exposures Directive contains basically the same definitions as
the already implemented EEC banking directives, especially regarding the terms
"credit institution," "financial institutions," and "own funds." 94 However,
different from the Large Exposure Recommendation, the term "exposure" as
defined in the Draft Large Exposures
Directive includes all risks defined in the
95
Solvency Ratio Directive.'
185. Annex to the Large Exposures Recommendation.
186. Id. art. 3(2). For the definition of "own funds," see Own Fund Directive, supra note 36. For
the definition of "exposure," see Large Exposures Recommendation, supra note 184, annex 1, art.
I & app.
187. Annex to the Large Exposures Recommendation, supra note 185, art. 4(1).
188. Id. art. 4(2).
189. Id. art. 4(3).
190. Id. art. 3(1).
191. Id. art. 5(l).
192. Supra note 142.
193. Draft Large Exposures Directive, supra note 142, third "whereas" clause.
194. Id. art. 1.
195. Id. art. 1, indent 7. However, the Draft Large Exposures Directive does not require the
weighing of risks as provided in the Solvency Ratio Directive. Id. Underwriting commitments for the
issue of securities are "exposures." Id.
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The Draft Large Exposures Directive also provides for a reporting requirement
of large exposures. 196 Consistent with the definition in the Large Exposures
Recommendation, "large exposure" is every exposure of a credit institution to
97
a client or a group of connected clients, exceeding 15 percent of own funds.'
The overall limit on the aggregate of large exposures shall be 800 percent of own
funds, whereby a single large exposure shall not exceed 40 percent of own
funds. 198 A special limit shall apply to exposures by a credit institution to its
affiliates other than its own subsidiaries, which shall be 30 percent of own funds
in aggregate. 199
The Draft Large Exposures Directive grants the Member State authorities the
right to exempt certain exposures fully or partially or to apply a weight to a large
exposure of from 0 percent to 20 percent of the nominal exposure. 200 Such
exempted exposures include loans to certain affiliates of credit institutions and
claims against central governments, central banks, and the European Communities.
"Group of connected clients" shall mean "two or more persons, whether
natural or legal, constituting one single risk," whereby ownership and control
rights among the connected clients are to be taken into account. 2 ° ' Since this
rather important definition is vague, it is hoped that it will be rephrased in clearer
terms before the Draft Directive is adopted.
The control of large exposures shall be effected on the basis of a consolidated
supervision,0 2 following the principles laid down in the Replacing Consolidation
Directive. 2
VII. The Proposed Winding-Up Directive
The Amended Proposal for a Council Directive Concerning the Reorganization and the Winding-Up of Credit Institutions and Deposit Guarantee Schemes
(the Winding-Up Directive) 20 3 is concerned with the reorganization of failing
credit institutions, their winding-up if reorganization should fail, and the provision of sufficient guarantee schemes in the Member States to protect deposits in
credit institutions. The Winding-Up Directive does not provide substantive rules
on the actual winding-up 20 4 or reorganization 2 05 procedures, but provides for
home country control of measures intended to safeguard or restore the financial
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Id. art. 3(1).
Id. art. 3(2).
Id. art. 4(1) & (3).
Id. art. 4(2).
Id. art. 4(5)-(8).
Id. art. 1, indent 13.
Replacing Consolidation Directive, supra note 132, art. 3(5).
COM(88)4 Final, O.J. (No. C 36) 1 (1988) thereinafter Winding-Up Directive].
Id. art. 2(3), annex II.
Id. art. 2(1), annex I.
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situation of, and the winding-up of, a credit institution. The Winding-Up Directive lays down different rules depending on whether the head office of the credit
institution concerned is located inside or outside the Community. If a credit
institution with a head office inside the Community is to be involved in a
reorganizational measure, the process will be handled by the Home Member
State authorities according to the laws of the Home Member State. The measures
will be fully effective against every branch of the credit institution, even if the
branch is located in a Host Member State where the laws do not provide for such
measures. 206
Reorganizational measures concerning branches of credit institutions having
their head office outside the Community will be carried out according to the laws
of the Host Member State by the competent authorities in the Host Member State
in which the branch is located. Exceptions to that rule are possible if reciprocal
2 7
treatment is being ensured by a treaty with the non-EEC home country. 0
Winding-up is defined by reference to Member State laws providing rules on
the voluntary or, in cases of bankruptcy, involuntary liquidation of credit institutions.2 °8 Credit institutions with their head office inside the Community will be
wound-up according to the laws of their Home Member State by the Home
Member State's authorities, and decisions on the winding-up by the Home Member State will be fully effective against such credit institution's branches situated
in other Member States . 209 EEC branches of credit institutions based outside the
Community will be wound up according to the Host Member State's laws where
the branch is located.21 °
VIII. The Deposit-Guarantee Recommendation
The aim of the Recommendation Concerning the Introduction of DepositGuarantee Schemes (the Deposit-Guarantee Recommendation) 21' recommends
the EEC-wide introduction and harmonization of deposit guarantee schemes.212
Deposit guarantee schemes are provisions designed to guarantee appropriate
compensation for depositors in order to protect them against losses. 2 13 As a mere
recommendation, the Deposit-Guarantee Recommendation does not require the
Member States to conform their laws to it but is still thought to be a 2tstrong
4
inducement for the voluntary introduction of deposit-guarantee schemes.

206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Id. art. 4.
Id. art. 8(1).
Id. art. 2(3), annex II.
Id. arts. 11, 14.
Id. art. 15(1).
87/63/EEC, O.J. (No. L 33) 16 (1987) [hereinafter Deposit-Guarantee Recommendation].
See Winding-Up Directive, supra note 203, seventh "whereas" clause.
Id. art. 2(4).
Deposit-Guarantee Recommendation, supra note 211, fifth "whereas" clause.
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The Deposit-Guarantee Recommendation recommends certain minimum standards for existing and future deposit guarantee schemes throughout the EEC.
According to the Deposit-Guarantee Recommendation, 2' 5 deposit-guarantee
schemes of a Member State should
(i) guarantee compensation for depositors who are not in a position to
properly assess the financial policies of their banks,
(ii) cover the depositors of all authorized credit institutions, including the
depositors of those being branches of credit institutions authorized in
another Member State (thus the Host Member State and not the Home
Member State of a credit institution is responsible for deposit insurance
of branches),2 16
(iii) distinguish clearly between intervention prior to winding-up and compensation afterwards, and
(iv) set out the criteria for compensation and the formalities to be completed
in order to receive compensation.
At present, such guarantee schemes do exist in most Member States. However,
the various deposit protection schemes in the Member States differ widely in
their legal structure and in their protective scope. They differ, for instance, on the
question of whether legal persons as well as natural persons are covered and up
to what amount depositors are covered. Still open is to what extent a further
harmonization of deposit-guarantee schemes is intended by the Commission by
way of a directive. One of the key issues in connection with such further harmonization might be the question of whether the Host Member State, as is now
the case, or the Home Member State will have the responsibility and authority to
regulate and supervise deposit guarantee schemes.
IX. Bank Accounting Directive
In 1986, the Council of the European Communities adopted the Council Directive on the Annual Accounts and Consolidated Accounts of Banks and Other
Financial Institutions (the Bank Accounting Directive).21 7 In order to make it
possible for creditors, borrowers, and shareholders, as well as the public, from
different Member States to better compare the annual accounts and the consolidated accounts, 21 8 the Bank Accounting Directive provides EEC-wide harmonized accounting standards for credit and financial institutions. The provisions in
215. See id. art.I(a)-(d).
216. See id. art.1(b);
Winding-Up Directive, supra note 203, art. 16(l). As a transitional
measure, pending entry into force of a deposit-guarantee scheme in each Member State, the Home
Member State of a credit institution must insure that its deposit-guarantee scheme extends to cover
deposits received by branches of such credit institution in other Member States that have no depositguarantee scheme. Id. art. 16(2); Deposit-Guarantee Recommendation, supra note 210, second
"whereas" clause.
217. Supra note 146.
218. Bank Accounting Directive, supra note 146, third
& tenth "whereas" clauses.
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the Bank Accounting Directive governing annual accounts of credit institutions
are also necessary to provide a uniform basis for the coordination of supervisory
standards for credit institutions, such as authorization requirements and other
indicators used for supervisory purposes. 2 19 The Bank Accounting Directive
only addresses the specific accounting problems of credit institutions 220 without
establishing an independent and separate set of rules beside the general account22
ing directive applicable to other business entities. '
The Bank Accounting Directive requires broader publication of the financial
status of credit institutions than is required for other companies. Specific items
that according to national accounting rules could be compensated with other
balance sheet items will have to be more clearly identified. This requirement
applies especially to the publication of the results derived from "own trading in
securities" as well as to the compensation of losses with those results. Hidden
reserves are henceforth restricted.
X. Capital Adequacy Directive
In May 1990, the Commission published a draft proposal of the Capital Adequacy Directive 222 to lay down the capital adequacy requirements for market
risks of investment firms 223 and credit institutions. The Capital Adequacy Directive addresses the market risks resulting from securities transactions as well as
from transactions in derivative products and in foreign exchange. It is considered
to be a necessary follow-up to the Investment Services Directive 224 to ensure that
investment firms and credit institutions, with respect to their engagement in the
investment business, are adequately capitalized. A common approach throughout
the EEC of how to cover risk exposure is necessary for the mutual recognition of
investment firm licenses enabling investment firms to operate throughout the
Community by virtue of their Home Member State licenses.225
The Capital Adequacy Directive provides for minimum initial capital requirements by investment firms in a similar fashion as the Second Banking Directive
does for credit institutions.2 26 The Capital Adequacy Directive generally requires
that investment firms maintain at all times sufficient own funds to cover the
various risks associated with their activities.227 The directive applies to credit
institutions insofar as credit institutions shall maintain-in addition to the re219. Id., sixth "whereas" clause.
220. Id., seventh "whereas" clause.
221. Fourth Council Directive, supra note 180.
222. Capital Adequacy Directive, supra note 38.
223. Supra note 80.
224. See supra note 79.
225. Investment Services Directive, supra note 79, art. 12; see THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 28, 1990.
226. Capital Adequacy Directive, supra note 38, art. 3. For the initial capital requirements of
credit institutions, see supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
227. Capital Adequacy Directive, supra note 38, art. 4(l).
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quirements already imposed by the Solvency Ratio Directive-sufficient own
funds to cover:
(i) the position risk regarding the long and short positions (after hedging
and netting) in order to protect against adverse price movements;
(ii) the foreign exchange risk, resulting from adverse exchange rate movements; 228 and
(iii) the counterparty risk, i.e., risks resulting from unsettled transactions in
securities, to the extent that a counterparty might not be able to carry out
its obligations. 229
Capital has to be put up against each of the various risks so identified. 230 The
Capital Adequacy Directive provides detailed rules to calculate the required
amount of own funds separately to cover the various market risks outlined
above. 231 The ratios applicable to the various market risks vary.
The definition of "own funds" in the Capital Adequacy Directive is generally
taken from the Own Funds Directive. 232 However, credit institutions and investment firms are allowed to supplement up to 250 percent of their core capital with
"soft capital," i.e., subordinated loans for the purpose of the capital adequacy
calculation. 233
The competent authorities of the Member States may permit investment firms
an alternative calculation of "own funds," which focuses more on liquidity than
solvency. Pursuant to the alternative calculation, illiquid assets are deducted in
full from capital, but a greater amount of subordinated debt is included in the
capital basis of investment firms. 2 34 This is fully consistent with the fundamental
objectives of securities market regulators, considering the highly liquid nature of
such firms' assets. It is also in line with the approach adopted by U.S. securities
market regulators. 235
In countries with a universal banking system, credit institutions are to a great
extent involved in the investment business. As credit institutions they are already
subject to the capital requirements for credit risks in the Solvency Ratio Directive. The introduction of an additional capital adequacy requirement for market
risks that allows a different calculation of own funds if the investment activities
are carried out by an investment firm would have a substantial effect on its
competitive position. Consequently, the discussions between the various national
authorities on the correct approach to cover market risks were influenced by the

228. Id. art. 4(2).
229. Id., explanatory memorandum, clause 5.3.
230. Id. art. 4.
231. See id. annex I-V. Other than in the Solvency Ratio Directive, consolidation of capital
adequacy standards is not required within a group.
232. Id. annex VI, clause 1.
233. Id. annex VI, clause 2.
234. Id. annex VI, clauses 3-5.
235. Id., explanatory memorandum, clause 14.
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fact that the universal banking system prevailing in some Member States and the
system that separates commercial banking from investment banking prevailing in
other Member States will be affected by the Capital Adequacy Directive in
different ways. Accordingly, the proposed Capital Adequacy Directive is widely
regarded as the most controversial harmonization directive.
In an effort to provide for equal treatment of investment firms and credit
institutions, it is currently discussed that, regarding market risks on open positions in equities and fixed-rate securities and the counterparty risk, the Member
State authorities should have the option either (i) to apply to credit institutions the
applicable ratios of the Solvency Ratio Directive or (ii) to apply to the trading
book of the credit institution the capital requirements in the Capital Adequacy
Directive. 236 The latter approach would allow credit institutions to which the
Own Funds Directive applies to take advantage of the more generous provisions
regarding the subordinated loans in the Capital Adequacy Directive.
XI. Conclusions
The new EEC banking law will harmonize the major areas of the law applicable to the EC banking and investment services market. Further harmonization
will follow both with regard to areas already covered by existing directives and
recommendations and with regard to other areas not yet touched. Legislative
proposals include the harmonization of liquidity ratios, which are currently entirely left to regulation by the authorities of Host Member States.
The directives must be transformed into national laws of the Member States
and, therefore, it is now up to the Member States to implement the guidelines and
instructions laid down in the various banking directives and to create a wellbalanced and viable system for the regulation and supervision of credit institutions.

236. Id. annex VI, explanatory memorandum, clause 9; see supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
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